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Summarv of Findinas and Conclusions 
The Government has placed increasing emphasis in recent years on 
the role of roads investment in promoting economic growth and 
increasing the competitiveness of industry through reduced 
transport costs. This can be seen as consistent with the 
Government's broader economic and political programme for Britain 
involving the reduction of the 'burden1 of public expenditure on 
private sector capital accumulation and the re-orientation of 
of such expenditure in such a way as to enhance its role in 
supporting and promoting the profitability of the private sector. 
Changes in the Government's approach to supporting and 
controlling expenditure by local authorities on roads 
construction and improvement have been implemented within this 
context. Specifically, the reform of the TSG system in 1985/86 
concentrated government support with the purpose of encouraging 
local authorities to build or improve roads which provide 
particular benefits to longer distance commercial and industrial 
traffic and which otherwise might not have high priority in terms 
of purely local considerations. 
The resources provided to local authorities through TSG have 
increased in real terms since 1985/86 and have constituted an 
increasing proportion of the spending power provided through 
capital allocations. This is particularly so since 1987/88 when 
allocations were reduced on the assumption that authorities would 
be able to apply spending power accumulated through capital 
receipts to roads capital expenditure. In fact, spending power 
from receipts is unevenly distributed between authorities and for 
the many which are in practice unable to apply receipts to roads 
expenditure the result has been a severe restraint on the 
resources available for those elements of their highways capital 
programmes which are directed at specifically local problems and 
needs. 
Since the bulk of TSG support is in respect of major schemes 
which are subject to detailed monitoring by the DTp (86% of gross 
accepted expenditure in 1988/89 was for major works) there has 
been a tendency for the restraints on capital allocations to 
erode the scope for the exercise of discretion by authorities in 
the direction of resources to meet local needs through integrated 
transport plans and programmes. Fewer resources are available 
for non-TSG programmes of local highway and traffic management 
schemes, facilities for cyclists, schemes to improve public 
transport operation and promote inter-modal co-ordination, and 
parking facilities which provide the degree of control necessary 
to integrated and co-ordinated transport planning. The scope for 
such an approach to meeting local transport problems and needs 
has also been eroded by the reduction in control by local 
authorities over the provision of local public transport services 
due to the deregulation of local bus services in the 1985 
Transport Act. 
The analysis of resource provision for local road construction 
and improvement is subject to the problem of limited timescale 
since the reform of the TSG in 1985/86. In that year there were 
clearly many uncertainties about the new system and the following 
year brought the disruptions due to the abolition of the GLC and 
metropolitan counties which resulted in a net transfer of 
resources to the successor authorities (particularly the 
metropolitan districts) at the expense of the shire authorities. 
Since 1986/87 there has been a relative shift in resources back 
to the south of the contry, primarily to the Outer London area 
where several major road schemes have made heavy demands on TSG 
resources. This has been at the expense of other authorities 
whose share of TSG has declined. The Inner London Boroughs have 
suffered reductions in both TSG and capital allocations. The 
shire counties have experienced significant reductions in capital 
allocations. The metropolitan districts have suffered less of a 
reduction in allocation in absolute terms but have seen it 
decline as a proportion of their TPP bids. This is particularly 
so in the larger city authorities. 
However, it is the shire counties which have suffered most from 
the reduction in capital allocations because these authorities, 
on the whole, do not have access to capital receipts on the scale 
assumed by the Government in setting allocations. This is 
firstly because transport does not generate capital receipts on a 
substantial scale and, secondly, because the shire counties do 
not have responsibilities for housing, the major source of 
receipts. Moreover, actual spending power from receipts is 
unevenly distributed between authorities. In particular, there 
is something of an imbalance between the north and south of the 
contry arising from the substantial differentials in land and 
property values. 
The metropolitan districts, as housing authorities, do, in 
general, have substantial capital receipts. However, these 
authorities would appear to be experiencing some difficulties in 
assigning receipts to support roads capital programmes arising 
from three sources. First, a reluctance on the part of Housing 
Committees to give up spending power from receipts because of the 
severe housing problems experienced by many metropolitan 
authorities. Second, the priority assigned to roads expenditure 
relative to the other traditional, long-established services 
(such as education, social services, housing, leisure and 
community services and economic development) which face heavy 
demands for increased expenditure due to the range of economic 
and social problems in these areas. Third, the magnification of 
these effects by the reductions in capital allocations for those 
other services. 
The net result of these effects has been a severe restraint on 
non-TSG roads capital expenditure because spending on TSG- 
supported works has increased consistent with the Government's 
provision. This has adversely affected the ability of 
authorities to address transport problems and needs which are, by 
definition, of specifically local importance. Authorities are 
having to delay highly cost-effective schemes directed at local 
traffic, environmental and safety problems and designed to assist 
local economic development. Schemes to improve provision for 
cyclists and to improve the effectiveness and attractiveness of 
public transport appear to be suffering particularly badly. 
Delays to badly-needed structural repairs and improvements to 
roads and bridges and to programmes for replacement and 
improvement of street lrighting create increased demands on 
revenue spending and higher future demands on capital 
expenditure. Lack of funds for off-street parking facilities 
creates potential difficulties for the development of commercial 
centres and tourism and for authorities wishing to employ parking 
development in strategies to achieve effective management of 
traffic. 
The level of local authoritiesn bids and expenditure in relation 
to TSG-eligible schemes suggests a commitment on their part to 
the TSG system and the belief that benefits justify locally-borne 
costs. However, there are various grounds for concern about the 
effectiveness of the TSG and capital control systems from the 
local authority view point. Areas of concern include the level 
of support for minor works, lack of grant support for capitalised 
structural re-conditioning works, cuts in spending on 'less 
visible1 structural renewal, and implications for authoritiesn 
ability to pursue integrated and co-ordinated approaches in local 
transport planning. The uneven distribution of spending power 
from capital receipts exacerbates the mis-match between needs and 
resources with adverse implications for effectiveness. 
From the Government1s point of view effectiveness is enhanced by 
the high level of competition for TSG resources but a question 
mark arises against the extent to which TSG has promoted the 
construction since 1985/86 of schemes which would not otherwise 
have been implemented by authorities, from a purely local 
viewpoint. Authorities1 willingness to design and build such 
schemes in the future may become more dependent on the extent to 
which the wider capital control system permits them to direct 
adequate resources to meet problems and needs which are purely 
local in character and which have suffered under the present 
operation of the system. 
Uncertainty also surrounds the effectiveness of TSG support in 
terms of the promotion of economic growth through reduced 
transport costs and this produces questions about the balance of 
resources between TSG and non-TSG programmes, particularly since 
the latter include local schemes to support industrial and 
commercial developments. More research is needed in this area. 
This question of balance also raises distributional issues 
because TSG schemes tend to benefit rather different groups than 
non-TSG schemes directed as specifically local needs. We also 
see an emerging distributional issue in regional trends in 
resource allocation relative to patterns of economic growth. 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Backaround 
This report presents results from the third and final stage of 
a research project, funded by the Rees Jeffreys Road Fund, which 
aims to assess the impact of recent changes in central government 
policies and powers in relation to local government finance upon 
local authorities1 transport expenditure and outputs, and upon 
their approach to addressing local transport problems and needs. 
Two previous working papers present findings from the first two 
stages of the project. The first (Sanderson, 1988A) reviews 
relevant changes in government policies and financial control 
mechanisms and identifies major research issues. The second 
(Sanderson, 1988B) presents the results of an analysis of trends 
in local authorities1 transport expenditure relative to the 
Government's spending plans and expenditure provisions over the 
period since 1979/80 which attempts to identify the impact of 
changes in government policies and controls. 
This working paper reports the findings of a more detailed 
examination of the operation of the system whereby the Government 
provides resources for, and exercises control over, local 
authorities' capital expenditure on local road construction and 
improvement. Within this broader context the operation of the 
Transport Supplementary Grant system is examined and, in 
particular, an attempt is made to assess implications of capital 
expenditure controls for selected local authorities in terms of 
their ability to address effectively the transport problems and 
needs of their areas. 
1.2 Research Focus 
The previous working papers referred to above have highlighted 
the concern of central government over the past decade to achieve 
greater control over local authorities' expenditure. Indeed 
there has been an increasing emphasis on bringing such 
expenditure into line with the Government's objectives and 
spending plans as specified in the annual Public Expenditure 
White Papers. To this end the Government has introduced complex 
systems for controlling both current and capital expenditure by 
local authorities in relation to central expenditure provisions. 
However, our analysis has raised doubts about the effectiveness 
of these systems in achieving the Government's objectives; 
indeed, the major lsuccessl for the Government - the reduction in 
local authorities' public transport revenue support expenditure - 
can be attributed mainly to the abolition of the GLC and 
metropolitan counties, the subsequent imposition of direct 
expenditure controls by the Secretary of State on the PTAs and 
the 'nationalisationl of London Regional Transport. 
As regard local authorities' expenditure on roads, the degree of 
discrepancy from the Governmentls plans and provisions is now as 
large, or larger than at any time during the past eight years 
since the introduction of the present expenditure control 
systems. More specifically, a significant underspend, relative 
to the Government's plansi-.has emerged in recent years; tlrus, on 
1987/88 estimates current expenditure on road maintenance was 
some 12% below the Government's provision while budgeted roads 
capital expenditure by local authorities was 24% below provision 
(see Figure 1). From the viewpoint of our research the important 
questions go beyond the clear problems relating to the 
effectiveness of expenditure control systems in achieving the 
Governmentls objectives. They concern the extent to which they 
affect local authorities1 ability to address effectively their 
local transport problems and needs. 
The significant degree of underspending on local roads capital 
expenditure has re-emerged in the context of the reformed 
Transport Supplementary Grant (TSG) system. From 1985/86 TSG was 
discontinued in respect of local authorities1 current expenditure 
and restricted to capital expenditure on roads 'of more than 
local importance1. The purpose of the reform was to encourage 
capital expenditure by local authorities on "... roads which form 
part of the primary route network of major through routes, 
important urban roads, and bypasses and relief roads which 
relieve communities of the effects of heavy through traffic.I1 
(Department of Transport, 1984, para. 2.) The extent of local 
authorities1 underspending therefore raises the question of the 
effectiveness of the new TSG system in the context of the wider 
system of capital expenditure control. 
Indeed, our analysis to date has indicated the importance of this 
wider system in influencing local authorities1 expenditure 
behaviour so the changes which have been made recently by the 
Government to this system clearly provide an important focus as 
the context within which the TSG system itself should be 
examined. This is the approach which we adopt in the present 
analysis of implications for local authorities1 effectiveness in 
addressing local needs. 
1.3 Structure of Revort 
The analysis is structured as follows. In Section 2 we outline 
the Governmentls objectives and policies for local roads and this 
is followed, in Section 3, by a discussion of the framework for 
the financing of capital expenditure by local authorities on road 
construction and improvement and some issues relating to both TSG 
and capital allocations. Section 4 examines trends in resource 
provision for local roads capital expenditure since 1985/86 
relative to local authorities1 assessed needs as measured by TPP 
bids and concludes with a discussion of some issues in the 
distribution of resources. In Section 5 we examine in more 
detail the implications for selected local authorities in terms 
of their ability to meet their perceived needs for roads capital 
expenditure to tackle local transport problems. Finally, in 
Section 6 we summarise our findings and highlight the main issues 
and conclusions. 
2. The Government's Policv for Roads 
The most recent White Paper setting out the Government's 
objectives and policies for roads was published in April 1987 
(Department of Transport, 1987a). These objectives and policies 
are also elaborated upon in the DTpts submission to the House of 
Commons Transport Committee for their examination of the 1987 
Public Expenditure White Paper (Department of Transport, 198733). 
These documents stress the Government's commitment to sustaining 
a high level of investment in roads. The general policy 
objectives relating to this commitment are: 
a) to provide, or promote the provision of, a road network 
which yields an adequate return on investment and 
maintenance costs in terms of benefits to industry and other 
road users, with full regard to safety and environmental 
considerations; 
b) to promote the effective use of the road system in ways 
which procure a reasonable balance between the conflicting 
needs for movement, safety and the environment (Department 
of Transport, 1987b, para 2). 
Central government is directly responsible for the construction 
and maintenance of a network of some 6300 miles of motorways and 
trunk roads. These 'nationalr roads comprise only 4% of the 
total road network in England but carry about 30% of total 
vehicular traffic and some 40% of heavy goods road traffic. The 
objectives for the construction of such roads are stated as: 
i to assist economic growth by reducing transport costs; 
ii) to improve the environment by removing through traffic 
(especially lorries) from unsuitable roads in towns and 
villages; and 
iii) to enhance road safety (Department of Transport, 1987a, 
para 2.4). 
Local authorities are responsible for some 158,600 miles of 
classified and unclassified roads and the Governmentrs objectives 
for expenditure on such 'local' roads are 'I. to enable local 
authorities within cost-effective limits to maintain and improve 
their roads: 
(a) to meet growing business and other traffic and so reduce 
costly delays and accidents; and 
(b) to provide safe and convenient facilities for cyclists and 
pedestrians, and to improve the en~ironment.~~ 
(Department of Transport, 1987b, para 38) 
It is clear that the Government places considerable emphasis on 
the promotion of economic growth through road construction. As 
regards national roads, the 1987 White Paper indicates In... 
certain changes in emphasis. ..I1 since 1980: - 
I1Since then the funds allocated to the trunk road programme 
have been substantially increased, largely because o£ the 
importance attached to roads in aiding economic growth and 
increasing the competitiveness of industry through reduced 
transport costs. 
(Department of Transport, 1987a, para 2.5) 
The potential role of roads investment in assisting economic 
growth is elaborated upon as follows: 
 s successive governments have realised that a modern and 
efficient economy needs a modern and efficient road system. 
Exporters must have easy access to ports and airports. Good 
road links make it easier to encourage economic development 
in parts of the country with exceptionally high 
unemployment. Development of tourism is an important source 
of employment generation and is helped by good access, 
particularly to some of the remoter parts of the country ... 
The Government is committed to reducing the burdens upon 
industry, and better roads reduce one great burden." 
(ibid, para 3.1) 
It is also argued that Government spending on roads contributes 
to the effectiveness of initiatives aimed at encouraging the 
private sector to invest in the renewal of the inner cities, to 
undertake new development and to create new activity and new job 
opportunities in urban areas (ibid, para 3.2). 
In supporting local authorities' expenditure on the construction 
and im~rovement of local roads, the Government places particular 
- 
emphasis upon those roads which are defined as being It. . of more 
than local importance ...In because they carry significant amounts 
of longer distance through traffic and therefore complement the 
national network. Since the importance of such roads extends 
beyond a particular local authorities' area the Government has 
concentrated Transport Supplementary Grant (TSG) since 1985/86 to 
support capital expenditure on them (ibid, para 2.12). 
The purpose of TSG is In... to encourage local authorities to 
build or improve through routes that might not otherwise have 
high priority, in terms of purely local considerations, in the 
authorities' roads programmes1I (ibid, para 2.13). Support for 
such schemes can therefore be related to the Government's 
priorities firstly, to assist economic growth by reducing 
transport costs and, secondly, to improve the environment by 
removing through traffic from towns and villages: 
"The national interest requires that traffic, particularly 
commercial and industrial traffic, should flow freely and 
cost-effectively. Some local authority roads handle flows 
of long-distance or through traffic similar to those on 
national roads, or are roads of particular importance within 
major urban areas. The Government's policy is that these 
local authority roads should complement the Department's 
roads in quality and capacity having regard to the needs of 
the traffic using them. It is also the Government's- policy 
to relieve residential and shopping areas of heavy through 
traffic, particularly lorries, where this is practicable." 
(Department of Transport, 1988, para lo) 
3. The Financina of Local Road Construction and Imvrovement 
Local highway authorities make annual submissions to the 
Department of Transport in the form of 'Transport Policies and 
Programme (TPP) documents. These outline highways and traffic 
management capital programmes which authorities consider will 
best meet the needs of their areas. Based upon such programmes 
authorities make a bid for resources for the next financial year 
in respect of both schemes which are considered to be eligible 
for TSG support and a programme of TSG-ineligible expenditure 
(Department of Transport, 1988). 
The Secretary of State for Transport then decides the amount of 
each authority's submitted expenditure to accept for TSG support 
and grant is paid at a- rate of 50% of this 'accepted 
expenditure'. TSG is paid as a block grant in respect of the 
accepted programme as a whole but all major schemes (with a total 
cost of £1 million or more) in the programme are ,named1 and 
monitored by the DTp to ensure that actual expenditure on them is 
in line with estimates. Minor schemes (with a cost of less than 
£1 million) are not named and are accepted for support in an 
undifferentiated minor works block (ibid). 
The Secretary of State also specifies capital allocations to 
cover expenditure by each authority on roads. Such allocations 
provide 'spending power8 within the local authority capital 
control system (as established by the Local Government Planning 
and Land Act 1980) and borrowing approval to finance capital 
expenditure. Each authority's allocation is sufficient to cover 
TSG accepted expenditure plus an amount to take account of other 
(TSG ineligible) capital expenditure on roads as proposed in the 
TPP, such as expenditure on road schemes of mainly local 
importance, vehicles, plant, machinery and depots for road works. 
Since 1987/88 capital allocation in respect of parking schemes 
has been provided only in exceptional circumstances; authorities 
are expected to make use of trading profits and to look to the 
private sector for the provision of off-street parking wherever 
possible (ibid) . 
The Government's total provision for capital expenditure on local 
roads is specified annually in the Public Expenditure White 
Paper. Capital allocations are set lower than provision because 
of local authorities' spending power deriving from capital 
receipts. However, whilst the DTp recognise that there is 
considerable variation in the ability of individual authorities 
to make use of receipts, current legislation does not permit the 
Secretary of State to take account of individual authorities8 
actual receipts when allocations are set. Consequently, 
authorities1 allocations are set on the basis of aggregate 
assumptions about the availability of receipts to supplement 
borrowing. Such assumptions may not be valid in relation to the 
actual situation facing individual authorities. 
As indicated earlier, TSG is paid as a block grant in respect of 
accepted expenditure on the capital programme as a whole. The 
DTp advises authorities that I#... your council may decide how 
best to use it." However, in practice authorities are subject to 
certain conditions in their use of TSG. Thus, the DTp nlonitors 
progress on 'named8 major schemes in order to ensure that 
authorities' expenditure on such schemes is in line with that 
accepted for TSG. If the actual expenditure on a scheme in any 
one year is significantly less than accepted expenditure, an 
adjustment to TSG can be applied in the following year. 
Moreover, if an authority experiences unforeseen delays in a 
named scheme, it must secure approval from the DTp before any 
alternative scheme can be substituted into the accepted 
programme. Such conditions lead to a possible criticism that: 
InLocal choice and flexibility there ore appears illusory and 
the grant is in effect 'specific'." f 
Local authorities have criticised certain specific aspects of the 
TSG system. For example, Avon County Council have identified 
three problem areas. First, in relation to the system of TSG 
adjustment due to scheme delays it is argued that: 
In.. the difficulties of assembling realistic programmes and 
payments forecasts and then achieving them should not be 
underestimated. For example, some of the delays experienced 
in land acquisition in the past have been reduced by early 
resort to Compulsory Purchase Order procedures, but even 
then unforeseen difficulties, sften beyond the control of 
the County Council, can arise." 
Second, since TSG is payable only on estimates of future 
expenditure and cannot be paid retrospectively, any eligible 
expenditure incurred by an authority in advance of a scheme being 
accepted (such as capitalised design costs, land purchase or 
advance works costs) cannot attract TSG in a subsequent year. It 
is argued that: 
In.. withholding TSG support from these essential elements 
of a scheme undermines the ability of the County Council to 
plan and implement long term capital programmes effectively. 
Moreover, the impact gets progressively worse as the size of 
a scheme increases. '13 
Thus, Avon County Council spent £942,000 on surveys and advance 
design up to March 1985 in respect of the Avon Ring Road for 
which no TSG assistance was received. However, the DTp will now 
conditionally accept expenditure in advance of the start of main 
works on large schemes with high advance costs. 
Third, because TSG support is restricted to expenditure up to and 
including the financial year following that in which a scheme 
actually opens to traffic, any claims under the Land Compensation 
Act 1973 (relating to property depreciation due to noise, 
vibration etc.) are effectively excluded from grant support zince 
such claims can be made only 12 months after a scheme opens. 
As indicated earlier, TSG support is restricted to expenditure on 
roads of more than local importance which complement the national 
network. More specifically, the criteria of eligibility for TSG 
specify expenditure relating to: 
----------------------------.------------------------------------ 
.*. 
1. See section 'Notes on Text1 
a) highways which form or would form part of the Primary Route 
Network (PRN) ; 
b) bypasses and relief roads or traffic management measures 
which relieve communities, major shopping centres or 
important historic or tourist areas of the effects of heavy 
through traffic, particularly lorry traffic; 
c) other major roads which handle flows of long-distance or 
through traffic similar to those handled by PRN roads, for 
example important urban roads, such as designated roads in 
London handling heavy traffic flows of more than local 
importance, and links to the Primary Route Network or 
motorways. (Department of Transport, 1988, Annex A) 
It is clear that TSG support is designed to encourage local 
authorities to build and improve roads to meet the needs, 
primarily, of commercial and industrial traffic and to achieve 
the objectives of promoting economic growth and relieving 
communities of the environmental impacts of such traffic. Other 
roads expenditure, which authorities must finance from their 
authorised capital spending power net of TSG, is that directed at 
specifically local problems and needs. This includes expenditure 
on smaller road improvement schemes and traffic management 
measures, footway schemes, accident remedial measures, street 
lighting, cycling schemes, vehicles, plant, machinery and depots 
required for road networks. Such schemes are seen by authorities 
as being of substantial local importance: 
'I... they enable a large number of problem sites, spread 
over the County, to be tackled ... many are genuinely ur ent 
and likely to be the subject of intense local pressure." 9 
Avon County Council receives over 4000 letters and petition 
annually relating to traffic management and road safety problems f?! 
so expenditure to address such problems will be of particular 
interest to local members. Following the reform of the TSG 
system Kent County Council expressed concern about the exclusion 
from grant support of 'I... m ny highway improvement schemes which 
give great local benefits."' Particular concern was expressed 
about the exclusion of schemes which give assistance to industry 
by allowing development to proceed where otherwise constrained by 
poor access. It is evident that many local authorities now give 
some priority to local economic development objectives in the 
formulation of their roads capital programmes. However, the 
ability to progress schemes which promote local industrial 
development depends primarily on non-TSG capital spending power. 
Thus, the DTp have advised Cleveland County Council that: 
' I . . .  our aims for TSG are to support roads of more than 
local importance for the national benefits to movement of 
people, goods and services rather than local policies. In 
this context, we would regard local policies for the 
encouragement of industry as a matter for local 
authorities. #l8 
This raises an interestimg issue given that the Government's 
first objective for road construction is to assist economic 
growth. Schemes on the major road network which contribute to 
this objective primarily by reducing transport costs are 
considered as meriting TSG support. However, local schemes which 
contribute to this objective by making an area more attractive to 
industry and opening up areas for development are not seen as 
meriting grant support. In the consideration of the issue of the 
effectiveness of the use of resources allocated to TSG, the 
question of the relative economic benefits of these two types of 
schemes is therefore of some importance (we return to this issue 
later). 
It is evident that the resources available to local authorities 
for transport capital expenditure over and above that which is 
accepted for TSG support are of considerable importance to their 
ability to plan facilities and services in an integrated and co- 
ordinated manner so as to address effectively local transport 
problems and needs. The non-TSG element of authorities1 capital 
programmes, as well as expenditure on small highway schemes, 
local traffic management and cycling schemes, includes facilities 
for parking and public transport. Indeed, the Government now has 
a presumption against providing capital allocation for parking 
projects, considering lo. that authorities should look to the 
private sector to secure new off-street car parks.l1 (Department 
of Transport, 1988, para 18K). In many cases, therefore, 
authorities wishing to proceed with parking schemes will have to 
use capital allocations from other service blocks or capital 
receipts. 
This treatment of car parking has been criticised by authorities 
as hindering further their ability to develop integrated 
transport plans. According to Avon County Council, It.. parking 
forms but one element of an integrated land-use transp rtation 
policy and cannot therefore be treated in isolation.11 ' Kent 
County Council have expressed doubts about authorities' ability 
to secure sufficient parking facilities under the new 
arrangements. lo Reports considered recently by the West Midlands 
Regional Forum express similar doubts: 
"However, it is unlikely that the private sector will wish 
to provide all off-street parking requirements or wish to 
finance major structural repairs to existing multi-storey 
car parks. Car parks should not be treated simply as 
trading undertakings, because there are other outputs and 
factors that influence decisions on the provision of, and 
charges for, car parking. Such factors include the need to 
attract town centre shoppers, or responsibilities to reduce 
traffic c ngestion by providing P 'park-and-ride' facilities." 
"This change in Government policy is to be regretted as it 
will prejudice the ability of Authorities to properly co- 
ordinate their transport policies and development proposals. 
Integrated transport planning, which is particularly 
important in the large Urban Areas, has already suffered by 
the deregulation of public transport and the removal of off 
street car parking provision from Local Authorities will 
exacerbate the problems particularly in Town Centres."12 
- 
.-. . 
More generally, Manchester City Council is critical of the 
present framework for the planning and financing of local 
transport, in particular the move away from the concept of 
comprehensive transport planning to achieve the balanced and co- 
ordinated development of land use and all transport facilities: 
forms of transport should be judged by their 
contribution to the attainment of democratically endorsed 
policies as they relate to public transport, traffic 
management, pedestrian movement and road improvement. These 
policies would be set in a wide social and planning context 
and form part of a 23-ordinated and integrated approach to 
transport planning.'' 
At the present time, the fragmentation of planning and provision 
and the systems for central government control over the financing 
of local transport are seen as hindering such a development. 
Recent developments in the system for control of capital 
expenditure would appear to have undermined further the potential 
for integrated transport planning in many authorities. Thus, as 
indicated earlier and as shown in Figure 1, roads capital 
allocations to authorities since 1987/88 have been restricted and 
set below the level of provision to allow for the ability of 
authorities to apply capital receipts. Since current legislation 
does not permit individual authorities1 actual receipts to be 
taken into account in setting their allocations, it is clear that 
the global assumptions used by the Government will leave many 
authorities with reduced spending power due to low levels of 
actual receipts. There is evidence that the Shire gounties, in 
particular, tend to suffer in this situation. Moreover, 
expenditure accepted for TSG has increased, and accounts for a 
growing proportion of capital allocations nationally - 70% in 
1988/89 compared with 61% in 1986/87. Therefore, non-TSG 
elements of authorities1 capital programmes have become more 
dependent upon their ability to apply capital receipts (or vire 
allocation from other service blocks). This makes capital 
programmes directed at specifically local needs more vulnerable 
and potentially erodes the capacity for the integrated 
development of local transport facilities. We will examine this 
issue in more detail below, in the context of an assessment of 
the extent to which the systems for control of capital 
expenditure on local roads have permitted local authorities to 
address their local problems and needs. 
Under the present system for financing capital expenditure on 
local roads, local authorities1 capital programmes can be broken 
down into various components in terms of the source of spending 
power. These components are illustrated in Figure 2 with 
reference to four authorities, Kent, Hereford and Worcester and 
Cleveland County Councils and Birmingham District Council. The 
first component is the programme of expenditure accepted for TSG 
support. This expenditure is covered fully by an authority's 
roads capital allocation and supported by TSG at the rate of 50%. 
The main element is expenditure on 'named1 major works which is 
monitored closely by the DTp and therefore, in effect, represents 
a 'first call1 on capital resources. The minor works element of 
accepted expenditure is not subject to the same detailed scrutiny 
but nevertheless the DTp--is concerned with the effectiveness of 
this expenditure and has indicated to authorities that "... 
support for expenditure on minor works will continue to depend on 
a clear igentification in the TPP of the benefits to be gained 
from it1'. It is not clear that this is totally consistent with 
the statement that ' I . . .  minor works in the accepted programme 
may be any cayital works on roads of more than local 
importance ... II but it indicates that authorities must give 
some priority to such expenditure. 
The second main component of roads capital programme is 
expenditure which is not eligible for TSG support but this 
comprises two elements in terms of the source of spending power. 
Part of this expenditure can be financed within the authority's 
roads capital allocation from borrowing authorised thereby. 
However, if an authority's roads allocation is insufficient to 
cover the expenditure programme that it wishes to pursue, then 
additional spending power must be obtained. The two possible 
sources of such spending power are first, the virement of capital 
allocation from other service blocks and, secondly, the use of 
capital receipts up to the levels prescribed by the Government. 
The potential for allocating such spending power to roads 
expenditure will vary from authority to authority firstly, 
because of differential availability of capital receipts and, 
secondly, because the application of the available receipts and 
the virement of capital allocation between services is a function 
of local political priorities. 
Therefore, the balance between TSG-eligible and non-TSG 
components of roads programmes will differ considerably between 
authorities depending upon the levels of TSG-accepted 
expenditure and roads capital allocation and the ability to 
secure additional spending power to meet perceived needs for 
expenditure on roads. From Figure 2 it can be seen that Kent 
County Council pursued a relatively large non-TSG programme in 
1987/88 but largely due to the ability to supplement the roads 
capital allocation through virement and the use of receipts. On 
the other hand, Hereford and Worcester and Cleveland County 
Councils were unable substantially to supplement their roads 
allocations resulting in very small non-TSG programmes. 
Birmingham City Council's non-TSG programme for 1987/88 was due 
entirely to the Council's ability to supplement the roads 
allocation by some f3.5 million from other sources; indeed, the 
TSG-eligible programme alone exceeded the roads allocation by 
some 22%. 
Having considered in general terms issues relating to the system 
for financing of capital expenditure on local roads we can now go 
on to look in more detail at the operation of the system in 
practice since the reform of the TSG system in 
4. Resource Provision for Roads Caoital Ex~enditure since 
1985/86 
4.1 The Local Authority View 
There has been widespread criticism from local authorities that 
the Government's restraints on capital expenditure prevent them 
from addressing effectively their local problems and needs. For 
example, Kent County Council, stressing the special problems and 
needs caused by large amounts of heavy goods traffic moving 
between London and the channel ports, criticise low levels of TSG 
and capital allocation which constrain their ability to implement 
a programme of road improvements which would be highly cost 
effective and beneficial in terms of its contribution to economic 
growth : 
"By any objective yardstick, the expenditure needed for 
Kent's transport greatly exceeds available resources. Only 
those schemes with the very highest priority can currently 
be considered for the Councilrs Works Programmes. Increased 
support from Central Government, through both the Transport 
Supplementary Grant and the level of prescribed Capital 
Allocations, is essential to the County being able to 
accelerate its programme of highway improvements. "17 
Cleveland County Council has argued that more resources for roads 
expenditure are necessary if local economic problems are to be 
solved : 
"The local authorities in Cleveland have been making 
strenuous efforts to stem the economic decline that has hit 
the county. However, the scale of the problem is such that 
only a co-ordinated approach, together with major financial 
assistance from the UK Government and EEC, is likely to have 
any significant impact ... road construction is one of the 
few ways in which large sums of money can produce benefits 
to a local economy very quickly. 
The County Councilrs total capital allocation for highways 
in 1985/86 was less than f7m. This is totally inadequate to 
give any impetus to the Councilrs urban policief and this 
needs to be doubled at least to begin to do so." 
The problems facing authorities in the West Midlands are outlined 
in a report considered by the West Midlands Regional Forum as 
follows: 
"The situation in the West Midlands is worse than the 
national figures would suggest. Lack of investment over the 
years ... is also apparent in capital expenditure. Although 
the national network of motorways is well developed and 
being extended in the region, the local feeder roads to the 
national network are extremely poor, many of them passing 
through town centres and residential areas. Unfortunately, 
despite the increased provision made for the current year, 
Local Authorities generally have been unable to commence 
schemes to overcome t difficiencies because of the reduced 
capital allocations. d8 - 
Manchester, Birmingham and Sheffield City Councils all emphasise 
the special problems faced by large urban areas facing problems 
of economic restructuring and sub-standard road infrastructure, 
arguing that both TSG and capital alloca3&ons fail to come 
anywhere near the levels justified by needs. 
In the next section we examine trends in the distribution of 
resources provided through both TSG and capital allocation in 
terms of local authority classes and regions. In section 4.3 we 
look at the extent to which resources have matched authorities' 
assessed needs as measured by their TPP bids. In conclusion we 
highlight some issues arising from this analysis. 
4.2 The Pattern of Resource Provision 
Figure 3 indicates that expenditure accepted for TSG (and hence 
TSG itself which is paid at 50% of accepted expenditure) 
increased in real terms between 1985/86 and 1988/89, particulary 
since 1986/87. However, the distribution of TSG between classes 
of authority has changed quite significantly since 1985/86 
(Figures 3-4). In 1986/87, following the abolition of the 
metropolitan counties and the GLC, the metropolitan districts and 
London boroughs received an increase in TSG (25% and 12% more 
respectively than their predecessor authorities) at the expense 
of the shire counties, which experienced an 11% decrease. Since 
1986/87 the London boroughs have obtained most of the real terms 
growth in TSG, increasing their share of the total from 20% to 
22% mainly at the expense of the shire counties whose share has 
therefore fallen from 64% in 1985/86 to 55% in 1988/89. (Figure 
4a). 
However, since 1986/87 there has been a significant 
redistribution within London, the Inner London boroughs 
experiencing a 31% decrease in TSG while the Outer London 
boroughs obtained a 32% increase, related to the construction of 
some large schemes such as the Hayes By-Pass and the North/South 
route through Enfield and Haringey. Therefore, since 1986/87 
more than half of the total real terms growth in TSG has been 
directed to the Outer London area, supplemented by a transfer of 
resources from inner London. (Figure 4b). 
The picture is similar, but rather more marked, when we consider 
roads capital allocations, because since 1986/87 total 
allocations have been cut by 6% in real terms (Figure 3). The 
small national increase in 1986/87 was due to a substantial 
increase for the metropolitan districts but the shire counties 
experienced a 4% reduction. Since 1986/87 the shire counties 
have suffered the largest reduction (13% in real terms); the 
metropolitan districts have experienced only a slight reduction 
while the London boroughs have received a 12% real increase. 
Once again, however, it is the Outer London boroughs which have 
gained with a 31% increase while the Inner London boroughs have 
experienced a 30% decrease. Therefore, since 1985/86 the shire 
counties' share of the national road allocation has fallen from 
62% to 54%, matching the fall in share of TSG. The main 
beneficiaries have been the Outer London boroughs, whose share 
increased from 14% in 1986/87 to 19% in 1988/89; the metropolitan 
districts have broadly maintained their share since 1986/87. 
(Figure 4d). 
The trend between 1985/86 and 1988/89 in the regional 
distribution of TSG-accepted expenditure and roads capital 
allocation per head of population is shown in Figure 5. The 
relative transfer of resources to the metropolitan areas in 
1986/87 is reflected in the trends for Yorkshire and Humberside, 
the North West and West Midlands in particular. On the other 
hand, shire counties in the East Midlands and East Anglia would 
appear to have been the biggest losers. The shift of resources 
to Greater London since 1986/87 is evident, both in terms of TSG 
and capital allocation. However, trends in other regions are 
more complex. The North and West Midlands have made relative 
gains in terms of per capita TSG (the metropolitan districts 
having done particularly well) but have been less generously 
treated in terms of capital allocation; this is particularly so 
in the West Midlands. Yorkshire and Humberside has suffered a 
decline in per capita TSG and allocation; since 1986/87 the 
metropolitan districts in West and South Yorkshire have fared 
badly in terms of allocation and those in South Yorkshire have 
experienced a sharp decline in TSG. Of the shire areas, only the 
East Midlands has continued to experience a decline in per capita 
TSG and allocation. The South West has made relative gains since 
1986/87 in terms of both TSG and allocation. The South East 
(excluding Greater London) however, while maintaining its share 
of TSG, experienced a decline in per capita allocation. 
Overall, then, as Table 1 shows, there was a relative shift of 
resources for roads capital expenditure from the South and 
Midlands to the North in 1986/87 following the abolition of the 
GLC and metropolitan counties, the main beneficiaries being the 
metropolitan districts of Greater Manchester and West Yorkshire, 
the main losers being the shire counties in the East Midlands and 
East Anglia. Since 1986/87 there has been a relative shift of 
resources back to the South, away from the North in particular 
but also, again, from the Midlands. The main beneficiaries have 
been Greater London (particularly, as we saw above, the Outer 
London boroughs) and to a lesser extent the South West. The main 
losers in the North have been the metropolitan districts of South 
Yorkshire while the East Midlands shire counties have continued 
to experience a decline in both TSG and capital allocation. 
Table 1 
Distribution of Transport Supplementary Grant and Roads 
Capital Allocation 1985/86 - 1988/89 (Percent) 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
T r a n s p o r t  S u p p l e m e n t a r y  G r a n t  Roads C a p i t a l  A l l o c a t i o n  
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -  
1985186 1 9 8 6 / 7  198718  1 9 8 8 / 9  198516 198617 198718  198819  
- - - - - - . - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - * - - -  
N o r t h  2 5 . 7  2 8 . 9  2 7 . 7  2 6 . 3  25 .1  2 7 . 9  2 7 . 1  2 6 . 3  
M i d l a n d s  2 0 . 3  1 8 . 4  1 7 . 7  1 7 . 4  1 8 . 9  1 8 . 1  1 8 . 5  1 7 . 4  
South  5 4 . 0  5 2 . 6  5 4 . 7  5 6 . 2  5 6 . 0  5 3 . 9  5 4 . 5  5 6 . 3  
Notes : North - North, North West and Yorkshire and - 
Humberside 
Midlands = East Midlands and West Midlands 
south - East Anglia, Greater London, south' East 
and South West 
4.3 Resource Provision versus Needs 
Analysis in terms of per capita resources does not address fully 
the issue of the extent to which resources match needs. Indeed, 
it is difficult to obtain objective measures of the need for 
roads capital expenditure but it is possible to make the 
assumption that the bids for resources submitted to the DTp by 
local authorities in their annual TPPs reflect a careful 
assessment of their problems and needs. However, it must be 
borne in mind that authorities' bids will also be influenced by 
pragmatic considerations not directly related to expenditure 
needs, so caution is required in such an analysis. Figure 6 
shows that nationally, a high level of bid for both TSG and 
capital allocation was made in 1985/86 relative to the DTp 
acceptance levels. Thus, only half of bids for TSG were accepted 
in aggregate while total roads capital allocations during the 
year covered 64% of total bids. In 1986/87 and 1987/88 TSG bids 
were scaled down in real terms (particularly in the shire 
counties) before increasing again in 1988/89 (mainly due to 
increases in the London boroughs and metropolitan districts). 
Bids for capital allocation have remained reasonably constant in 
real terms after a decline in 1986/87 mainly in the metropolitan 
districts. 
This pattern of bids suggests a degree of over-optimism by 
authorities in 1985/86, the first year of the new TSG system, 
partly due to uncertainty about the criteria of eligibility for 
TSG support. Indeed, authorities required extensive discussions 
with the DTp on this issue during 1984 when bids were submitted. 
Moreover, the abolition of the GLC and metropolitan counties 
clearly caused some disruption in 1986/87; in the metropolitan 
areas bids were significantly reduced from the previous year 
while in London bids were increased. Therefore, some caution is 
required in interpreting bids in these years as accurate 
reflections of needs. However, since 1986/87 the pattern has 
stabilised somewhat so there can be more confidence in the 
analysis. 
Figure 7 illustrates trends in the proportion of bids for TSG and 
capital allocation accepted by the DTp. In fact, the pattern is 
largely determined by fluctuations in the levels of bids because, 
as we have seen, there have been rather consistent trends since 
1986/87 in the distribution of TSG and capital allocation between 
London, the metropolitan areas and the shire counties. 
Nationally, the increasing proportion of TSG bids accepted in 
1986/87 and 1987/88 arises largely from the decrease in bids in 
real terms; similarly the reduction in the proportion accepted in 
1988/89 is due to an increase in bids in excess of the small real 
increase in TSG. As regards capital allocation the increase as a 
proportion of bids in 1986/87 was due to the reduction in bids; 
the decrease in the roads allocation as a proportion of bids in 
1987/88 and 1988/89 reflects the reduction in allocations by the 
Government to accommodate assumed availability of capital 
receipts. - .- 
Looking at the picture by class of authority, the extent to.which 
the metropolitan districts benefitted in 1986/87 is clearly 
evident, reflecting the significant increase in both TSG and 
allocation relative to reduced levels of bid. However, since 
1986/87 the resources allocated to the metropolitan districts 
have met a declining proportion of assessed needs; the small 
increase in TSG has not matched increased bids and capital 
allocation has been cut while the level of bid has increased 
substantially. As Figure 7c and d shows, these authoritiesf 
roads allocations now meet a lower proportion of their assessed 
needs than those of London and shire counties. 
In London the trend has been an increasing proportional 
acceptance of TSG bids (particularly in 1987/88 when bids were 
reduced) as TSG has increased in real terms. Moreover, Figure 7c 
shows how London authorities have fared better than others in 
terms of capital allocation, with an increasing allocation in 
real terms falling behind bids to a lesser extent than in the 
metropolitan districts and shire counties. Figures 7b and 7d 
also illustrate clearly the extent to which the Outer London 
boroughs have benefitted in terms of TSG and capital allocation, 
particularly in 1987/88 and 1988/89 and the extent to which the 
Inner London boroughs have suffered a decline in resources 
relative to their assessed needs (as well as in absolute terms). 
The shire counties experienced an 11% cut in real terms in TSG in 
1986/87, but their bids were reduced by 19% resulting in a higher 
proportional acceptance than in 1985/86. Since 1986/87 both the 
aggregate bid for TSG by the shire counties and the level of 
expenditure accepted for TSG have increased slightly in real 
terms so TSG resources have met a relatively constant proportion 
of assessed needs. On the other hand, the significant real terms 
decline in capital allocation for these authorities has resulted 
in a reduction in allocation as a proportion of total bids, but 
not to the same degree as in the metropolitan districts. 
Therefore, following the substantial changes in 1986/87 in which 
the metropolitan districts, in particular, benefitted from a 
transfer of capital resources (primarily at the expense of the 
shire counties) the picture has stabilised somewhat. In terms of 
the extent to which TSG and capital allocation have matched 
assessed needs, the Inner London boroughs and metropolitan 
districts have fared worst, particularly through the reduction in 
capital allocations (although it has to be borne in mind that 
many such authorities will be able to generate substantial 
capital receipts). The Outer London boroughs have benefitted 
most because of the substantial increases in both TSG and capital 
allocation. The shire counties have 'held their own* in terms of 
TSG but capital allocations have met a declining proportion of 
assessed needs. 
Looking at the situation in the metropolitan districts in rather 
more detail, there is evidence that the major urban centres in 
the metropolitan areas are experiencing particularly severe 
constraints on resources relative to their assessed needs as 
measured by bids. Figure 8 shows the trend since 1986/87 in 
accepted expenditure and roads allocation as a proportion of bids 
in six major urban centres compared with the metrdpolitan 
districts as a whole. It can be seen that these centres 
experienced a greater-than-average reduction in both TSG and 
allocation relative to their bids suggesting that these 
authorities face particular difficulties in addressing their 
problems and needs through roads capital expenditure. 
Again, it is possible to elaborate upon this analysis with 
reference to the regional picture shown in Figure 9. The 
benefits experienced by the metropolitan areas in 1986/87, in 
terms of both TSG and allocation, are reflected in the increased 
proportion of bids accepted in the North West and Yorkshire and 
Humberside in particular; the North and West Midlands benefitted 
rather more in terms of capital allocation than TSG. We saw 
above that shire counties in East Midlands and East Anglia 
suffered the biggest declines in resources in 1986/87; however, 
in the East Midlands this was matched by a decline in bids and 
only in East Anglia was there a significant reduction in the 
proportion of bids accepted for TSG and allocation. 
Since 1986/87 the North West, in particular, has suffered a 
decline in the proportion of assessed needs met by TSG and 
capital allocation and this reflects the experience of the 
metropolitan districts in Greater Manchester. Roads capital 
allocations to the North and Yorkshire and Humberside have fallen 
increasingly behind bids; in the North the bids of the Tyne and 
Wear districts have outstripped increasing allocations whereas 
in Yorkshire and Humberside allocations to districts in South and 
West Yorkshire have declined since 1986/87. In terms of the 
proportions of bids accepted for both TSG and capital allocation 
the districts of South Yorkshire fare particularly badly; in 
1988/89 the respective proportions were 25% and 37% compared to 
the average for all metropolitan districts of 59% and 55%. 
We discussed above the trend in Greater London since 1986/87, in 
particular the significant improvement in the position of the 
Outer London boroughs in terms of the extent to which both TSG 
and roads allocation met assessed needs. As regards regions 
dominated by shire counties, East Anglia has continued to 
experience a decline in the proportion of assessed needs met by 
TSG and allocation in spite of an increase in resources. The 
reverse situation has pertained in the East Midlands. In the 
South East (excluding Greater London) the increase in TSG but 
decline in allocation is reflected in the relationship to bids. 
We saw earlier that the South West has benefitted from a 
significant growth in both TSG and allocation since 1986/87 but 
this had not matched the degree of increase in bids. This 
suggests that resources are being re-allocated in response to 
bids but within constraints which limit authorities1 losses or 
gains. 
4.4 Issues in the Distribution of Resources 
On the basis of the above analysis we can draw certain 
conclusions but it is clear that the limited timescale of 
operation of the capital-only TSG system means that caution must 
be exercised. As indicated above, the first two years of the new 
system was subject to considerable uncertainty as authorities 
came to grips with the new system, and due to the abolition of 
the GLC and Metropolitan Counties which transferred 
responsibility for highways to authorities with only -limited 
previous experience in this area. 
We have seen that there has been a relative transfer of resources 
for roads capital expenditure to the Outer London authorities 
since 1986/87 mainly at the expense of the Inner London boroughs 
and shire counties. More generally the South of the country has 
increased its share of resources since 1986/87 more than 
redressing the shift to the North in that year following the 
abolition of the metropolitan counties. Since 1985/86 the share 
of resources allocated to the Midlands had declined due to 
reductions experienced by the East Midlands. In terms of the 
extent to which resources have met assessed needs (as measured by 
TPP bids), the Inner London borough and metropolitan districts 
have fared worst since 1986/87, although following the abolition 
of the metropolitan counties the districts were treated very 
generously in the 1986/87 settlement. Within the metropolitan 
districts the major urban centres appear to be experiencing 
particularly tight restraints on resources compared with assessed 
expenditure needs. In the Outer London boroughs resources have, 
in general, increased as a proportion of assessed needs. In the 
shire authorities the picture is mixed. A relatively stable 
level of TSG (in real terms) since 1986/87 has broadly matched 
the level of bids while the roads allocation has declined as a 
proportion of bids due to reductions imposed by the Government to 
account for capital receipts. Re-allocation of resurces between 
authorities has taken place in response to bids but it is clear 
that there are constraints on this process when resources are 
cash-limited, and when there is a significant proportion of 
committed resources from year to year in the major schemes 
programme. (In 1988/89 82% of accepted expenditure for major 
schemes was attributable to acceptance in previous years.) 
Since the resources available each year for roads capital 
investment are cash limited the competitive process of bidding 
for resources through TPP submissions is seen by the Government 
as helping to ensure that resources are directed towards 
investment that offers the greatest benefit (Department of 
Transport, 1987a, para 2.14). This implies that the assessment 
of priorities by the DTp at national level is important in 
determining the distribution of resources. Thus, it is only at 
this level that decisions to support particularly large road 
schemes in certain areas can be reconciled with considerations 
relating to fairness in the distribution of resources between 
other areas. 
For example, the decision to provide resources for some extremely 
large road schemes in the Outer London area has resulted in 
restrictions on the availability of TSG and capital allocations 
for other areas. This has resulted in reductions in TSG and 
allocations for the Inner London boroughs, restrictions on the 
growth of TSG in the metropolitan districts and shire counties 
and reductions in allocations in these authorities, particularly 
the latter. The effect on the Inner London boroughs suggests 
that some judgement may be made about a 'fair share' of resources 
for London as a whole with authorities having to 'wait their 
turn' for a share of the available resources. There is also some 
evidence of authorities 'taking their turns' in other regions 
which would support the notion that a broad view is taken at 
national level on the need-to ensure fair shares of resou*es for 
all regions. 
This raises the question as to what extent the shifts in 
resources which we have identified represent short-term trends 
reflecting the current outcomes of a competitive process or 
whether there are more systematic forces at work arising from the 
perception and valuation of the benefits from roads investment 
and particularly from schemes considered eligible for TSG 
support. Thus, when the large schemes in the Outer London area 
start to consume fewer resources, can the Inner London Boroughs 
expect to receive an increase to meet a higher proportion of 
their assessed needs? Or is it the case that road schemes in 
such urban areas do not perform well in terms of the benefits 
expected from schemes supported by TSG? In this connection, the 
significant decline in TSG relative to bids in the large urban 
centres in the metropolitan districts since 1986/87 is of some 
interest. Again, is the relative shift in resources to the south 
of the country since 1986/87 a temporary phenomenon or is it a 
reflection of the growth of economic activity in the south, 
relative to the North, which has resulted in increased road 
traffic and therefore an increased need for road investment as 
defined within the framework for assessing TSG support? 
This relates to the issue of the role of roads investment in the 
promotion of economic growth. We have seen that the Government's 
objectives for roads and the criteria for TSG support emphasise 
the role of new and improved roads in providing for longer 
distance commercial and industrial traffic, reducing costs for 
such traffic and thereby contributing towards economic prosperity 
(see above Section 2). There are two types of situation in which 
the need for roads investment can be demonstrated within this 
framework. 
The first is the situation in which the existing road 
infrastructure is perceived as inadequate to cater for the 
traffic arising from existing and projected levels of economic 
activity. The role of roads investment is therefore to 
accommodate traffic which is growing due to increasing economic 
activity, reducing transport costs and promoting economic growth. 
In such a situation the benefits are largely demonstrable, since 
a large proportion will arise from the accommodation of existing 
traffic. 
The second type of situation arises where new or improved road 
infrastructure is perceived as necessary to attract and promote 
new economic activity in areas currently experiencing problems 
due to a lack of economic development opportunities. The role of 
roads investment in this situation is to improve the potential 
for economic growth by improving an arears accessibility in 
relation to potential markets etc. In such a situation the 
benefits are largely predicted since a large proportion will 
arise from traffic generated by the anticipated economic 
development. 
The need for a road scheme and the benefits deriving therefrom 
are demonstrated more easily and on a firmer basis in the first 
of these situations and it would seem that the criteria for TSG 
support and the fragfwork for the demonstration of benefits (the 
'Annex B' framework ) aremore applicable to schemes arising in 
such situations. In particular, quantified benefits relating to 
provision for high existing flows of long distance heavy .goods 
traffic which can also be diverted away from existing communities 
suffering from the environmental impact of such traffic, produce 
a strong demonstration of need within this framework. This leads 
to the proposition that the criteria and assessment framework for 
TSG support will produce a tendency for such support to be 
directed more towards roads investment which  follows sf and 
supports the existing process and pattern of economic development 
than towards roads investment designed to generate future 
development. 
Looking at the pattern of TSG support in the shire counties since 
1985/86 there is indeed some evidence to support this 
proposition. Over the four year period since 1985/86 total TSG 
support to the shire counties represents £3.44 per capita per 
annum on average. Of the 13 cou?$ies with an average figure in 
excess of £4.00 per capita, nine are located in the South of 
the country (i.e. South East, East Anglia and South West) and a 
further two (Leicestershire and Northants) in the southern part 
of the East Midlands. In these eleven authorities the rate of 
unemployment fell by 38% over the four year period April 1984 to 
April 1988 compared to the average for Great Britain as a whole 
of 30%. In April 1988 their average rate of unemployment was 
5.7% compared to the British average of 8.9%. This is indicative 
of strong growth in economic activity in these areas providing 
the basis for the demonstration of need for TSG support for roads 
investment. 
However, this is to argue no more than that there is a tendency 
for resources for roads investment to be attracted towards areas 
of increasing economic activity which will in turn, of course, 
strengthen the attractiveness of those areas for the location of 
further activity - a form of 'virtuous circle1. On the other 
hand, it is clear that resources for roads investment are also 
directed to areas which make the case for new and improved roads 
to enhance the prospects for future development to overcome the 
existing lack of economic growth. Thus, Cleveland County Council 
has since 1985/86 received a relatively high average per capita 
allocation of TSG (£5.21) and a substantial proportion of these 
resources has supported road schemes associated with the Tees 
Corridor regeneration programme, an EEC-supported initiative 
In... to help finance the reclamation of derelict land along the 
Tees Corridor and provide new oads and infrastructure to bring 
new industries to Cleveland. Nevertheless, the objective of 
local economic regeneration is secondary within the framework for 
assessing TSG support to considerations of In... ational benefits B to movement of people, goods and services . . ."' . In a context 
of intense competition for limited resources, authorities whose 
needs for roads investment are related primarily to the objective 
of local economic regeneration may find it increasingly difficult 
to attract TSG support. 
If this is the case then the availability to authorities of 
resources to finance roads capital expenditure which falls 
outside the criteria for TSG eligibility becomes a crucial issue. 
It is indeed, of considerable wider importance to all authorities 
because, by definition, such expenditure addresses problems and 
needs which are essentially-local in character. Thus, within the 
non-TSG elements of their roads capital programmes authorities 
must accommodate all expenditure on schemes which, for example, 
provide local access to industrial and residential developments, 
provide environmental and safety improvements on local roads, 
provide traffic management solutions to local problems, provide 
new footways and pedestrian facilities, and facilities for 
cyclists; on car parking facilities which are considered 
essential but which cannot be secured from private sector 
involvement; on vehicles, plant, machinery and depot facilities 
required in association with highway works; and on any 
substantial highway reconstruction and improvement works which 
are financed from capital rather than from the revenue budget for 
maintenance works. All such expenditure must be covered by 
capital allocation or financed by capital receipts used to 
supplement an authority's block allocations. In the next section 
we examine the implications of restraints on capital resources 
for the ability of local authorities to address their local 
transport problems and needs through such programmes of capital 
expenditure. 
5. Imwlications for Local Authorities: Meetina Local Needs 
5.1 The Availability of Resources for Local Needs 
In view of the procedures followed by the Department of Transport 
for monitoring TSG-supported expenditure by authorities and the 
system of TSG ,adjustments1 for authorities not achieving their 
accepted programmes of major schemes in any year, it is clear 
that the ability of authorities to pursue non-TSG capital 
programmes to meet local needs is dependent, in large part, upon 
the availability of capital spending power from two sources. The 
first is the amount of roads capital allocation remaining after 
TSG-accepted expenditure has been accommodated. The second is 
the amount by which this residual allocation can be supplemented 
by virement from an authority's other block allocations and by 
the application of accumulated and in-year capital receipts 
within the limits prescribed by the Government. 
As regards the first of these sources we have already discussed 
the way in which changes in the Government's system of capital 
expenditure control in 1987/88 reduced capital allocations in 
relation to expenditure provision in order to allow for 
authorities1 spending power deriving from accumulated capital 
receipts. At the same time expenditure accepted for TSG has 
continued to increase so in 1988/89 it constituted 70% of the 
total of roads capital allocations for English authorities as a 
whole compared with 61.5% in 1986/87 (see Table 2 and Figure 3a). 
This means that, in effect, a significantly reduced proportion of 
the roads allocation is available for non-TSG programmes. 
However, the impact of this change differs between class of 
authority as shown in Table 2 and Figures 3b-d. Thus, since 
1986/87 the shire counties have experienced a significant 
reduction in capital allocation relative to a small real increase 
in TSG-accepted expenditure so the proportion of allocation 
remaining after the latter is deducted has fallen from nearly 40% 
in 1986/87 to about 29% in 1988/89. 
Table 2 
Exwenditure Accepted for TSG Support as a Prowortion 
of Roads Capital Allocations 1985/86 - 1988/89 
................................................................. 
1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 
................................................................. 
London : Inner Boroughs - 44.2 54.1 44.3 
: Outer Boroughs - 69.7 76.8 69.9 
: Total 53.4 62.0 71.3 65.6 
Metropolitan Areas 65.9 64.1 70.7 71.0 
Shire Counties 65.1 60.4 67.6 71.4 
England 62.8 61.5 69.1 70.0 
................................................................. 
Notes: 1. London and metropolitan area figures for 1985/86 
relate to the GLC and metropolitan counties 
respectively. 
2. Capital al-locations are final allocations, 
including supplementary allocations. 
The metropolitan districts have experienced a smaller reduction 
in allocations so the proportion available for non-TSG programmes 
has fallen from 36% to 29%. The London boroughs, on the other 
hand, have received an increase in allocations which nearly 
matches the increase in TSG accepted expenditure, so the 'non- 
TSG' proportion only fell from 38% to 34%. 
Therefore, in terms of financing non-TSG programmes, the pressure 
has been placed upon the shire counties and the metropolitan 
districts, to supplement their roads capital allocations either 
by virement from other block allocations or by using capital 
receipts. However, as we saw above (cf Figure 7), if 
authorities' TPP bids for resources are taken as a measure of 
assessed needs, the pressures placed upon the metropolitan 
district authorities increase in magnitude because of the extent 
to which allocations have fallen behind bids since 1986/87. It 
is apparent, then, that authorities' actual capacity to vire to 
roads expenditure from other block allocations and to utilise 
capital receipts has become increasingly important to their 
ability to meet their assessed needs for such expenditure 
particularly in relation to non-TSG programmes. 
This issue can be examined in more detail with reference to the 
situation in selected shire and metropolitan authorities. From 
such an examination it would indeed appear that many authorities 
are facing difficulties in implementing roads capital programmes 
which match up to assessed needs for expenditure. The primary 
cause of such difficulties is the reduction in capital 
allocations since 1986/87 and the problems faced in supplementing 
roads allocations by virement and receipts. Some authorities 
also face difficulties due to the restraints on revenue 
expenditure exercised through the block grant system which limit 
the expansion of capital programmes via the impact on debt 
charges. 
As regards this latter issue, the operation of the block grant 
system since 1986/87 results in a reduction in block grant for an 
authority as its expenditure increases, with the penalty rising 
sharply when the authority's expenditure exceeds a defined 
threshold in excess of its GRE. The revenue expenditure 
consequences of capital programmes are accommodated via a GRE 
component relating to debt charges on new capital expenditure 
(aggregated over most services) 25. If an authority1 s expenditure 
is below the threshold (typically GRE + 10%) £1 of increased 
revenue expenditure due to debt charges results in a loss of 
block grant of, typically, about 60p and therefore costs local 
ratepayers £1.60. In 1987/88 if Cleveland County Council, for 
example, had spent above their threshold of GRE + 9.58, the grant 
penalty would have risen to &.23 so each pound spent would have 
cost local ratepayers £2.23. 
In such a situation authorities are forced to consider carefully 
the revenue consequences of capital programmes, in the same way 
that such consequences had to be limited due to the operation of 
the system of expenditure targets and grant penalties before 
1986/87. Under that regime some authorities, such as Hereford 
and Worcester County Council, established policies which limited 
the full year revenue consequences of each year's -capital 
programme to a designated percentage of the total revenue budget 
( 0 . 5 %  in the case of Hereford and Worcester CC). Since the 
capital programmes for all services had to be accommodated within 
such limits roads programmes were vulnerable both to general 
expenditure restraints and to the determination of priorities 
across the range of services. A further problem was the 
'lumpiness1 of programmes containing large road schemes. The 
implications of such restraints for Norfolk County Council have 
been stated as follows: 
"In the case of Highways it has been evident for some time 
that a continued Capital Programme requires annual 
expenditure beyond that provided for in the revenue budget. 
The Planning and Transportation Committee decided that it 
was no longer feasible to finance further capital 
expenditure by borrowing because if growth was not permitted 
the loan charges could only in practice be met by 
unacceptable reductions in highways maintenance expenditure 
except to the extent that the effects of debt falling out 
could finance some further borrowing. 
In 1984/85 the Committee's capital programme was financed in 
part by applying the proceeds of some of the receipts from 
the sale of County Council land and property. The 
availability of further non-repayable advances from the 
Capital Fund is clearly of fundamental importance in the 
size of prog39mme so long as growth in the revenue budget is 
impossible. 
In such a situation revenue expenditure restraints were 
inhibiting authorities ability to spend up to their capital 
allocations for roads. However, the relative restraining impact 
on roads capital programmes of the systems for controlling 
revenue and capital expenditure would appear to have changed as 
the system of block grant penalties has been abolished and as 
capital allocations have been significantly reduced. The 
following represents the perspective of Herefore and Worcester 
County Council: 
"The revenue guidelines broadly maintain their value in real 
terms, as the price base of the revenue budget is updated 
each year. By contrast, there has been a downward trend in 
capital allocations over the years, and it is now proving 
more difficult to accommodate capital programmes within the 
spending limits imposed by capital alloc ions as enhanced 
by the approved use of capital  receipt^.^^ % 
The focus of the current concern of local authorities, therefore, 
are the restraints on capital allocations and the assumptions 
made by the Government about the ability of authorities to 
supplement allocations through the use of capital receipts. The 
Government's justification of these assumptions is as follows: 
"The Government's information indicates that, taken as a 
whole, local authorities have more than enough spending 
power from receipts to supplement capital allocations and 
achieve the expenditure assumed in the Autumn Statement. 
The position of individual highway authorities naturally 
varies but nearly --half of them appear at least as well 
placed in this respect as the national average. The 
receipts come from various services and the choice of how 
they should be spent is one for the local authority. 
However, if highway authorities generally were to give 
transport a high priority, then virtually all of them should 
be in a position to supplement their capital allocations by 
the p$gportion assumed in the Government's spending 
plans. It 
The basic assumption made by the Government in setting 
allocations is that all services will receive an injection of 
spending power from available capital receipts in proportion to 
their share of the total expenditure provision made in the Public 
Expenditure White Paper. The present legislative framework 
(provided by the 1980 Local Government Planning and Land Act and 
regulations made thereunder) does not permit the Government to 
take account of individual authorities' actual receipts in 
setting their allocations, nor to take account of the receipts 
actually accruing in a particular programme area (e.g. highways) 
in setting allocations for service blocks. 
In fact this assumption works to the disadvantage of highways 
capital expenditure. There are two main problems. First, 
transport functions do not generate a substantial amount of 
spending power from capital receipts - nationally, only about 
2.5% of the total. Therefore, in relation to transport capital 
expenditure, it has been estimated that the ratio of spending 
power from receipts to that from capital allocations is abOYtj 1:lz compared to near equality for all functions nationally. 
The Government recognises this and argues that authorities should 
give transport a high priority for the use of receipts generated 
by other functions. However, this raises the second main problem 
which relates to the distribution of receipts between classes of 
authority. 
In 1986/87 of the national total of capital receipts available 
within the prescribed proportions defined by government 
regulations, some 60% accrued to the shire district councils 
primarily from the disposal of housing and land. Consequently, 
the local authorities with the main transport expenditure 
responsibilities, collectively accounting for some 90% of the 
national total of capital expenditure on highways and local 
transport in 1986/87, had access to only 40% of national total of 
prescribed capital receipts. 31 As Figure 11 shows, the 
metropolitan district councils and, in particular, the shire 
counties had relatively low per capita prescribed receipts. The 
latter primarily due to their lack of housing responsibilities 
(cf. Figure 10c). As regards receipts actually applied in 
capital financing in 1986/87, the shire counties have the lowest 
degree of spending power from this source (some 10% of total 
financing); moreover, highways and local transport constitutes 
the highest proportion of the total capital programmes in those 
authorities (about 34% of total payments), as shown in Figures 
10a and lob. Table 3 summarises the situation in the London 
boroughs, metropolitan districts and shire counties. 
Table 3 
The Role of Ca~ital Receipts Relative to the Im~ortance 
of Trans~ort Capital Proarammes bv Class of Local 
Authoritv 1986/87 
................................................................. 
Figures in Percentages London Metropolitan Shire 
Boroughs Districts Counties 
................................................................. 
Proportion of Receipts in 
Capital Financing 22.3 14.6 
Transport as Proportion of 
Total Capital Payments 12.8 14.9 33.6 
Source: See Note 31. 
Therefore, there is an imbalance of spending power from capital 
receipts between authorities which operates to the detriment of 
expenditure on highways and local transport because of the 
position, in particular, of the shire counties, which have less 
ability than other authorities to generate receipts. However, 
there is an additional problem which arises from an imbalance 
between shire counties themselves in terms of this ability. 
Thus, authorities in the South of the country, and particularly 
the South East, are benefitting from escalating land and property 
values in the scale of their receipts creating a regional 
imbalance in spending power from this source. For example, in 
1986/87 the shire counties in the South East region accounted for 
72% of the total receipts applied to capital financing by all 
shire counties in England and 57% of prescribed receipts 
(compared with 36% of population). Therefore, in per capita 
terms the actual spending power applied from capital receipts for 
the South East shire counties in 1986/87 was £8.8, nearly double 
the shire county average of £4.6. The degree of imbalance is 
illustrated graphically in Figure 12 showing the West Midlands 
and South West shire counties some way behind those in the South 
East and slightly below the shire county average. However, 
authorities in the North of the country and in the East Midlands 
and East Anglia had much lower levels of spending power from 
capital receipts. 
Therefore, the shire counties in the North of the country in 
particular, can be expected to experience the greatest 
difficulties with the reduction in capital allocations in terms 
of their ability to supplement roads capital expenditure from 
capital receipts in accordance with the Government's assumptions. 
The adverse implications of this for the ability of these 
authorities to address local needs are increased when we consider 
the earlier discussion on regional trends in roads capital 
allocations. Thus, we found that since 1986/87 authorities in 
the North of the country have seen their capital allocations fall 
increasingly behind their bids for resources. Much of this 
effect is accounted for by-khe metropolitan district authorities 
but certain shire counties have experienced restraints on capital 
allocations. Cheshire, Durham and Northumberland and ,North 
Yorkshire have seen their capital allocations reduced 
significantly since 1986/87 both in absolute terms and as a 
proportion of their bids. In the Midlands, Staffordshire and 
Nottinghamshire have experienced similar trends. Most of these 
authorities are not generating capital receipts on a large scale 
and therefore will have increasing difficulty in meeting needs 
for roads capital expenditure. 
The resulting problems experienced by Cheshire County Council 
have been stated as follows: 
"Central government recognises that one of the shortcomings 
of the present legislation is that the DOE is not allowed to 
tailor an individual authorityrs capital allocation 
according to its capital receipts and this makes the County 
Councilrs position on Capital Allocation very difficult. 
Some Authorities can supplement their allocations from 
substantial capital receipts from the sale of capital assets 
such as land. However, Cheshire does not have capital 
assets available which can materially add to the sums 
available. Therefore, the Council has had to reduce its 
Capital Programmes in 1987/88, including that for highways. 
This has a 'knock on1 effect in later years and schemes 
cannot be progressed as rapidly as the Council would 
wish.1t32 
It should be pointed out that within the regional pattern 
outlined above there will be certain exceptions. For example, 
although the West Midlands and South West shire counties on 
average are well placed in terms of capital receipts certain 
authorities such as Shropshire and Cornwall have below average 
receipts. Therefore, in the 1988/89 TPP submission Cornwall 
County Council present the s3ye argument as that outlined above 
from Cheshire County Council. 
It is clear, therefore, that the Government's treatment of 
capital receipts in the process of setting authoritiesr capital 
allocations creates problems for roads capital expenditure 
because many shire counties do not in practice have access to 
receipts on the scale assumed by the Government. However, there 
is an additional dimension to the problem which relates to the 
relative priority attached to roads capital expenditure by 
authorities when considering the use of those receipts which are 
available and eligible for use in accordance with government 
regulations and the virement of capital allocation between 
service blocks. Thus, overspending by local authorities in 
recent years in respect of capital expenditure on education, 
social services and environmental services (e.g. on planning and 
economic development) suggest a relatively high priority for such 
services in the context of authoritiesr resource planning. 
Moreover, in the shire counties a large proportion of capital 
receipts derives from education and environmental services and 
authorities are likely to experience some difficulties in 
transfering such receipts on a large scale to roads expenditure. 
Figure 13 shows that in 1986/87 in the shire counties the excess 
of capital payments over allocations per capita was significantly 
greater for education than for transport indicating a degree of 
priority in the use of capital receipts towards the former 
service. This point is also illustrated by trends in capital 
expenditure in Hereford and Worcester County Council over the 
period 1981/82 to 1986/87 as shown in Table 4. It can be seen 
that spending on education, other services (which includes 
environmental services) and social services was in excess of 
capital allocations whereas expenditure on transportation was 
significantly below allocation over the period. Therefore, 
within this authority there has been an effective virement of 
allocation awav from transport and a priority in the use of 
receipts for education and other services. 
Table 4 
Ca~ital Emenditure Comwared with Allocations and Recei~ts 
Hereford and Worcester Countv Council 1981/82 to 1986/87 
................................................................. 
Capital Capital Exuenditure capital1 
Service Block Allocation Expenditure Allocation Receipts 
fm % fm % fm % 
................................................................. 
Education 12.5 19 22.7 32 1.81 6.8 37 
Transport 38.1 59 28.1 39 0.74 2.2 12 
Social Services 4.3 7 5.2 7 1.21 2.4 13 
Other Services 9.5 15 15.4 22 1.61 6.9 38 
Total 64.4 100 71.4 100 1.11 18.3 100 
Notes: 1. Total capital receipts arising over the period 
only prescribed proportions of which can be spent 
in any one year. 
2. Source is Hereford and Worcester County Council 
see note 28. 
In the metropolitan district authorities and London boroughs, 
this issue of relative priorities in the use of available 
receipts is the major consideration. These authorities have 
access to capital receipts on a substantial scale by virtue of 
their responsibilities for housing and, indeed, most local 
government services (see Figure 10). The abolition of the GLC 
and metropolitan counties therefore improved the potential for 
the application of receipts to highways expenditure in these 
areas. However, it would appear that this potential is not being 
fully realised in practice. In 1986/87, the first financial year 
following abolition, transport capital expenditure per capita was 
below per capita allocations in the London boroughs whereas 
spending on social services and, in the Outer London boroughs, 
education was significantly above allocation, as shown in Figure 
13. In the metropolitan districts per capita spending on 
highways was above allocation indicating some use of receipts but 
again to a somewhat lesser degree than education. 
It could indeed be expected that the metropolitan district 
authorities would experience some difficulty in assigning a high 
priority to highways expenditure for the use of available-capital 
receipts. There are three aspects to the problem. First, since 
most receipts are generated from activities which are the 
responsibility of well-established and relatively 8powerfu11 
committees of such councils there may be political obstacles to 
the transfer of receipts to other committees8 capital programmes 
on the basis of a corporate view of priorities. This is likely 
to be exacerbated by the second aspect of the problem which 
arises because highways capital expenditure became the sole 
responsibility of these authorities only following the abolition 
of the metropolitan counties so this 'new1 responsibility in 
1986/87 had to be accommodated in a context of a range of well- 
established services. It is to be expected, therefore, that it 
would take some time for the authority to become totally familiar 
with its new responsibilities and for new patterns of priorities 
to be established. However, the prospects for achieving a high 
priority for highways expenditure in such authorities are not 
helped by a third factor - the wide range of pressing problems 
and needs in the metropolitan areas which place demands for 
increased expenditure on local services particularly housing, 
education, leisure and community services and economic 
development. 
It will doubtless take a few years for new patterns of priorities 
to become established in the metropolitan districts and caution 
is therefore required in interpreting data relating to 1986/87 
and 1987/88. However, there would appear to be grounds for 
doubts about the potential for future expansion of roads capital 
programmes in these authorities if such expansion is dependent 
upon the application of capital receipts as is the case in the 
Government's present approach to capital expenditure control. 
The situation in the West Midlands, for example, has been stated 
as follows: 
"In the region only three Authorities have been able to 
substantially supplement their allocations using capital 
receipts and even these have ingpated that they will not be 
able to do so in future years." 
The situation in Sheffield City Council in 1987/88 illustrates 
the problems faced by a large urban authority in assigning 
priority to highways relative to other services: 
llAlthough anxious to fund and implement solutions to the 
various transportation needs within the city, the council 
regards problems related to housing and education, for 
example, as more pressing. As a result, it decided to adopt 
a highways capital programme amounting to £5.277 million 
which is gerginally less than the highways capital 
all~cation.~~ 
In 1986/87 Manchester City Councills expenditure on highways was 
£11.3 million compared to a capital allocation of £8.95 million, 
the difference being made up by virement from other service block 
allocations, the use of leasing facilities and the application of 
capital receipts. However, the Counci18s adopted highways 
capital budget for 1987/88 of £6.5 million was within a reduced 
roads capital allocation of £6.6 million. This change in 
circumstances arose from review exercises necessitated by the 
inadequacy of the Councills total capital allacation, 
supplemented to feasible limits by capital receipts, compared 
with the expenditure demands of all the Councills services.. The 
decision to budget within the roads allocation indicates that, in 
effect, greater priority was assigned to other services for the 
use of available capital receipts. This illustrates well the 
potential vulnerability of roads capital expenditure under the 
present conditions of capital expenditure restraint. 
Therefore, it is clear that the operation of the system for the 
control of local authorities1 capital expenditure is not 
promoting the achievement of the Government's objective of 
increasing expenditure on local roads. There are three aspects 
to the problem. First, the system itself operates through 
aggregate mechanisms and controls which do not provide a degree 
of refinement consistent with the Government's more detailed 
spending objectives for individual services. There is, in a 
sense, an inconsistency between the level and degree of detailed 
control over authorities1 expenditure desired by the Government 
(and reflected in its plans and provisions) and the ability to 
achieve this degree of control through systems which can be 
legitimised as consistent with traditionally-accepted principles 
of local authority autonomy, discretion and control over their 
own affairs. Second, within such a framework aggregate 
assumptions are necessary which fail to match the reality of 
situations faced by individual authorities or classes of 
authority; therefore, many authorities are unable to deliver 
outputs consistent with the Government's ~lans and objectives. 
~hird, the necessary scope afforded to local authorities within 
this framework to determine their own priorities in response to 
local assessments and perceptions of the problems and needs which 
they face means that in aggregate local authorities may choose 
not to deliver outputs consistent with the Government's plans and 
objectives . 
The substantial budgeted underspend by local authorities in 
1987/88 relative to the Government's provision for roads capital 
expenditure (some 24%) indicates the extent to which authorities 
are failing to match the Government's assessment of expenditure 
need within the present framework of capital expenditure 
controls. However, of greater importance are the implications 
for the ability of local authorities to address effectively the 
problems and needs of their areas and we can examine these 
implications with reference to information from selected local 
authorities. 
I 
5.3 The Im~act of Ex~enditure Restraints 1986/87 - 1987/88 
Detailed information on roads capital expenditure and provision 
was obtained from thirteen local glgthorities, nine shire counties 
and four metropolitan districts. Figures 14a and 14b compare 
the average per capita roads capital allocation for the total 
sample between 1985/86 and 1988/89 with that for all shire and 
metropolitan authorities (1985/86 shire counties only), 
disaggregated into TSG-accepted (major and minor schemes) and 
non-TSG components. It can be seen that the sample is somewhat 
below the average for all authorities in terms of both per capita 
allocation and TSG-accepted expenditure but the discrepancy 
decreases over the period of analysis. Thus, for 1988/89 the 
sample means for per capi-ta TSG-accepted expenditure and total 
allocation are 96% and 97% respectively of the means for all 
shire and metropolitan authorities. 
of particular interest from the point of view of our analysis is 
the extent to which the sample is representative in the years 
1986/87 and 1987/88. In this respect it can be seen from Figures 
14a and 14b (cf. also Figure 3) that the sample replicates the 
national picture quite well with a real-terms decline in per 
capita allocation and increase in TSG-accepted expenditure. 
Consequently, from the information relating to the selected 
authorities we can expect to obtain a realistic assessment of the 
effects of the reduction in capital allocations in 1987/88 on 
authoritiest roads programmes. 
In making such an assessment we focus in particular on changes 
between 1986/87 and 1987/88 because the latter year is the last 
for which comprehensive information on authoritiest capital 
budgets could be obtained. Figures 15a and 15b compare 
expenditure (budgeted in 1987/88) with allocation in each of 
these two years in the sample of shire counties and the total 
sample; the extent t which the shire counties dominate the total 
sample is evident. 86 It can be seen that in 1986/87 total 
capital expenditure on roads exceeded allocation; this is 
consistent with the national picture of an overspend against 
provision for roads and parking (of about 7.5%) given that 
national provision and allocation were approximately equal .37 
Two features of the picture in 1986/87 are particularly notable 
(Figure 15b). First, it can be seen that expenditure by 
authorities on TSG-eligible works exceeded the provision made by 
the Government for such works through capital allocations. 
Expenditure on major schemes is slightly in excess of the TSG- 
accepted level (this is due to an excess in the metropolitan 
districts) while expenditure on minor works is more than double 
that accepted for TSG support. Second, authorities in aggregate 
were able to supplement their roads allocations (either by 
virement from other block allocations or the use of capital 
receipts) so total expenditure was some 14% in excess of 
allocation. It can be seen that this was particularly important 
for the financing of TSG-ineligible expenditure. 
However, the discrepancy between expenditure and allocation in 
1986/87 illustrated in Figure 15b indicates a degree of variation 
between authorities. Figures 16a to 16m illustrates the position 
in each of the selected local authorities. While most 
authorities spent at or in excess of their allocations in 
1986/87, there are examples of underspending (cf Avon, Cleveland, 
Solihull). However, in the main examples (ie. the two shire 
counties) the underspending is primarily attributable to TSG 
major schemes and non-TSG expenditure; in both cases (and in 
Solihull) expenditure on TSG minor works is significantly in 
excess of the TSG-accepted level. This tendency to spend more on 
TSG minor works is also notable in Hereford and Worcester, 
Birmingham and Manchester; indeed, in the former two authorities 
it results in expenditure on TSG-eligible works exceeding the 
roads allocation. Also evident from Figures 16a-m is the 
differential ability of authorities to supplement their roads 
allocations; seven out of the thirteen authorities deploy such 
ability in 1986/87. - .- . 
Turning to the changes between 1986/87 and 1987/88 certain points 
can be made with reference to Figures 15a and 15b. First, 
despite the reduction in capital allocations, total expenditure 
in the sample authorities was reduced only slightly in real 
terms; indeed, budgeted expenditure in the selected shire 
counties in 1987/88 increased by some 4% over 1986/87. In 
aggregate, authorities were able to sustain their ability to 
supplement roads allocations at the level of the previous year. 
Nevertheless, this maintenance of spending power in spite of 
reduced allocations clearly does not match the increased 
provision for roads expenditure by the Government in 1987/88 (+ 
8.5% nationally) which implies a substantial increase in the use 
of capital receipts by authorities to finance roads expenditure. 
Figure 15 also shows that expenditure on TSG-eligible works 
increased in 1987/88 in spite of the reduction in allocations; 
most of this increase is accounted for by major works in the 
shire counties. Therefore, the excess of expenditure on TSG 
eligible works over the 'accepted' level increased from 18% in 
1986/87 to 22% in 1987/88; again, the discrepancy is greatest in 
the case of minor works. Consequently, in 1987/88 TSG-eligible 
expenditure accounted for a significantly increased proportion of 
allocations: 83% compared with 72% in the previous year. The 
scope for financing non-TSG expenditure within allocations was 
therefore reduced, such expenditure becoming more dependent upon 
the ability of authorities to supplement allocations. Thus, non- 
TSG expenditure fell from 37% of the total in 1986/87 to 32% in 
1987/88 and the proportion financed outwith capital allocations 
increased from 44% to 54%. 
Looking at the individual selected authorities (Figure 16a-m) 
whilst the majority received reduced allocations in 1987/88, 
certain authorities did receive increases, mainly associated with 
increases in TSG-accepted expenditure. The exception is 
Birmingham which achieved an increase in the non-TSG component. 
Most authorities, whether receiving increased or reduced 
allocations, experienced a reduction in the amount of roads 
allocation available for non-TSG expenditure, the most notable 
reductions being in Cheshire, Cornwall, Hereford and Worcester, 
Norfolk, Nottinghamshire and Manchester. Such expenditure has 
therefore become increasingly dependent in such authorities upon 
their ability to supplement their roads allocations. However, 
notwithstanding the increased importance of this ability in 
1987/88 it is clear that many authorities have been unable to 
respond in accordance with the Government's assumptions about the 
spending power from capital receipts. 
4 
It is indeed notable that amongst the selected authorities shown 
in Figures 16a-m it is primarily those which have been able to 
supplement their roads allocations that spend more on TSG- 
eligible works than allowed for in their allocations. Thus, 
Kent, Norfolk, Nottinghamshire, Oxfordshire and Birmingham 
account for most of the total loverspendingl on TSG-eligible 
works and 89% of the total spending power applied by the sample 
authorities in excess of roads allocations. It is also 
significant that more than half of the total overspend on TSG- 
eligible schemes in these authorities is attributable to 
expenditure on minor works. This points to a discrepancy between 
the Government's and local-authorities' perception as to the need 
for such expenditure and, more particularly, as to the 
appropriate balance between the major and minor components of the 
total expenditure accepted for TSG support. 
Most authorities in 1987/88, then, budgeted to achieve the levels 
of expenditure on TSG-eligible schemes accepted for grant support 
in spite of the fact that in some cases, reduced roads capital 
allocations and an inability to supplement them, caused total 
budgeted expenditure to be reduced from 1986/87. This suggests 
that the TSG system is working well from the Government's point 
of view. However, it means that certain authorities are 
experiencing severe restraints on the non-TSG elements of their 
roads capital programmes, for example, Cleveland (Figure 14c), 
Cornwall (Figure 16d), Hereford and Worcester (Figure 14e) and 
Manchester (Figure 16j). The implications of these restraints 
can be examined in more detail with reference to particular 
authorities. 
5.4 Exam~les from Selected Local Authorities 
First, we can refer briefly to problems being experienced even in 
authorities which have not experienced significant reductions in 
capital allocations. For example, Kent County Council (Figure 
16f) received a small real increase in allocation in 1987/88, but 
this was less than the increase in TSG-accepted expenditure so 
the amount of allocation available for non-TSG expenditure was 
reduced (by some 26%). The authority was able to supplement its 
roads allocation by the use of capital receipts but argued that: 
It . . .  unless there is a reversal in the current divergence of 
planned expenditure and the Government's prescribed 
allocation, it will, within a short time, become impossible 
to maintain adequate programmes of improvements and 
maintenance. 
The items of the roads capital programme potentially most 
affected in this situation are identified as follows: 
If... it is vital that capital allocation is available for 
the County Council's Reconditioning Programme, for smaller 
but highly cost effective highway improvements, traffic 
management schemes and traffic control systems, for the 
essential vehicles, plant and machinery needed to support 
works programm s, for depot improvements, and for bridge 3 strengthening. 
These items are seen as of considerable importance in terms of 
meeting assessed needs for roads capital expenditure. 
Reconditioning works "... are essential structural renewal of the 
asset but they contain a strong element of improvement to bring 
the carriageway up to modern standards of alignment ant thereby 
provide adequate provision for current traffic flows. O These 
works have not been accepted by the DTp for TSG support where 
they relate to roads of more than local importance and therefore 
were funded both by borrowing within the non-TSG component of 
capital allocation and from capital receipts. 
As regards smaller highways schemes, Kent County Council argue 
that In... important schemes.with rates of return on investment of 
over 30% have had to be postponed because of lack of capital 
resources.1141 An example of such a scheme delayed by restraints 
on capital allocation is the Medway towns southern peripheral 
road which is claimed to have considerable environmental benefits 
as well as a rate of return of 30%. Also subject to delay are 
"many other local highway improvement and traffic management 
schemes ... designed tf overcome specific local congestion or 
environmental problems. ; facilities for cyclists; and schemes 
directed at improving the effectiveness and attractiveness of 
public transport. The latter two items have received no 
provision in Kent's capital programme since 1985/86. Finally, 
the construction of new off-street parking facilities in 
Maidstone has been delayed because restraints on the County 
Council's capital allocation have prevented it from providing the 
borough council with the necessary allocation. Indeed, since 
1987/88 allocation has not normally been provided in respect of 
car parking and Kent CC argue that the provision of major new car 
parks under the new arrangements (with funding from the private 
sector or 4grom trading surpluses) will present great 
difficulties. 
Birmingham City Council also received a small real-terms increase 
in capital allocation in 1987/88 and within this greater scope 
was provided for non-TSG schemes due to a reduction in 
expenditure accepted for TSG support from 1986/87 (Figure 161). 
However, Birmingham's programme of TSG-eligible works is subject 
to a high degree of commitment and the roads allocation for 
1987/88 had to be supplemented to accommodate the TSG-eligible 
programme. This meant that non-TSG expenditure was entirely 
dependent upon the authority's ability to supplement the roads 
allocation, mainly from capital receipts. The non-TSG programme 
for 1987/88 comprised mainly expenditure on vehicle replacement 
and depot improvement and on minor road and bridge works and some 
pedestrianisation measures. It was these latter items which were 
particularly affected by expenditure restraints. A bid was made 
of £3.5 million in 1987/88 for capital allocation in respect of 
minor works ineligible for TSG but in the event only £1.12 
million was budgeted for such works. The effect was to delay 
work on the reconstruction of highways where carriageway failure 
had occurred and several schemes in the minor improvements 
programme includes junction improvements, traffic management 
measures, accident remedial measures, aids for public transport, 
cyclists, pedestrians and the disabled, minor bridge improvements 
and reconstructions, and street lighting improvements. Moreover, 
the decision to exclude provision for car parking affected a 
programme for multi-storey car park provision in Birmingham. 
Concern on the part of Birmingham City Council about the 
perceived inadequacy of capital allocation in relation to 
assessed needs prompted a direct approach to the Minister for 
Transport during 1987. The problem was stated as follows: 
"In view of the many other urgent calls on the City's 
capital resources, in particular the serious disrepair and 
structural problems of system built flat blocks, this makes 
it extremely difficult for us to respond to the need for 
improved access to the Convention Centre area in time for 
its opening; the long outstanding need to complete the 
Middle Ring Road; --the need to respond to the mafor re- 
orientation of long distance traffic that completion of the 
M40 will bring; and the achievement of the vitally nece 
improvements in access to the City's industrial areas." HarY 
The case for increased roads allocation was made in terms of, 
firstly, the need to support the economic regeneration of the 
city and to make the West Midlands an attractive alternative to 
the South East for industrial location and, secondly, the 
transport needs of a regional capital whicg5 experiences more 
severe traffic problems than other areas. In fact, this 
approach met with little success apart from an undertaking that 
the points made would be 'borne in mind1 when capital allocations 
for 1988/89 were set. 46 In the event, Birmingham1 s initial 
capital allocation for 1988/89 was some 9% lower in real terms 
than the initial allocation for the previous year. 
Cleveland County Council experienced a 9% real terms reduction in 
capital allocation (including supplementary allocations) between 
1986/87 and 1987/88 (Figure 16c). Having underspent on TSG- 
accepted major works expenditure in 1986/87 the authority 
suffered a substantial TSG adjustment in 1987/88 and budgeted in 
that year to spend at the TSG-accepted level on major schemes and 
slightly above on minor works. This meant that resources for 
non-TSG schemes were constrained given that the Council were not 
able to supplement the roads allocation substantially from 
capital receipts. 
In drawing up the roads capita3 programme the Council had to 
consider two specific problems. First, the failure to achieve 
early conditional acceptance1 for TSG on certain major schemes 
meant that advance design costs in respect of future schemes had 
to be borne fully by the non-TSG element of capital allocation. 
Second, the limited scope for non-TSG works on highway 
improvements and the 'small capital schemes1 programme 
(addressing problems of road safety, traffic capacity or highway 
defects) created potential problems for the Councills ,Direct 
Labour Organisation, which relied heavily on such works. In 
essence the Council had to establish a trade-off between the 
priority given to local highway problems and needs and to the 
maintenance of the DLO1s workload on the one hand and the cost of 
a TSG ,clawback1 in future years on the other. Thus, it was 
argued that: 
'I. switching money from the TSG section to small capital 
schemes ... enables a wider range of problems to be tackled 
on your total road network ... It also enhances 
opportunities for the DL0 although by no means to the point 
of workload security, but it will result in a penalty or 
clawback of grant in future years. The Department of 
Transport will state that reason for clawback is that grant 
was awarded to enable the Council to pursue its major 
priorites (eg Tees Corridor zghemes) rather than to 
implement small capital  scheme^.^^ 
Cheshire County Council suffered a real-terms reduction of its 
capital allocation of one third in 1987/88 (Figure 16b). This 
was mainly due to a substantial reduction in TSG-accepted 
expenditure but the non-TSG component was also reduced (by 30% in 
real terms). Like Cleveland CC, Cheshire had suffered-a TSG 
lclawbackl in 1986/87 so in 1987/88 budgeted up to the TSG- 
accepted level in respect of major schemes. The Council was able 
to supplement its roads allocation for 1987/88 in spite of a lack 
of substantial capital receipts indicting an ability to vire from 
other block allocations. Nevertheless, it was necessary to cut 
its roads capital programme from that requi d to address 
assessed needs causing delays to highway schemes. @ 
In the event, the 1987/88 roads capital programme was reduced by 
about 20% from that submitted in the bid for TSG and capital 
allocation. However, whilst the programme of major road schemes 
(over £1 million) was cut by only lo%, that for highway schemes 
under £1 million was halved. After accommodating commitments 
very few resources were available for new starts either on 
specific highway schemes or in the programme of minor 
improvements. Schemes subject to delay included the A533 Dunham 
Road Leftwich and the B5358 at Mottram St Andrews, both directed 
at local traffic and safety problems. Work on bridge 
strengthening, minor road improvements and provision for cycling 
and schemes for employment site access on local roads was subject 
to delay because no new starts were possible in 1987/88. 
The reduction in Cornwall County Council's capital allocation in 
1987/88 (16% in real terms from 1986/87) affected mainly the TSG 
eligible road programme (Figure 16c). In 1986/87 expenditure on 
TSG-eligible major schemes exceeded the level accepted for TSG 
support, an important consideration for the Council being the 
need to progress schemes receiving support from the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Such support is also received 
by the Council in respect of minor TSG-eligible schemes and some 
non-TSG schemes. Therefore, much of the Council's concern at the 
reduction in allocation in 1987/88 (and, within this, the TSG- 
eligible minor ~ g r k s  component) related to the potential threat 
to ERDF support. The Council also expressed its concern about 
the loss of capital allocation for car parking particularly in 
relation to the implications for two schemes in Newquay and 
Falmouth which are considered to be It.. essential to the onomy 
of the towns, particularly in the development of tourism.ll Zf 
Hereford and Worcester County Council experienced a reduction in 
capital allocation in 1987/88 of some 16% in real terms but since 
the TSG-accepted expenditure was only reduced slightly, the main 
effect was on allocation available for non-TSG expenditure which 
was halved (Figure 16e). In 1986/87 the ability of the Council 
to pursue a programme of TSG-eligible works in excess of the 
provision for them in the roads allocation had depended upon the 
ability to supplement this allocation from other sources. In 
fact, the Council's policy is to aggregate individual service 
block allocations into a single allocation for the Council as a 
whole and cover any excess of the total programm over this 
aggregate allocation by the use of capital receipts. g2 However, 
in 1987/88 the roads capital programme was reduced significantly 
and exceeded the allocation only by some 5%. The main effect on 
the non-TSG prograEye was to delay the B4503 Leigh Sinton to 
Malvern road scheme. 
The roads capital allocation for Manchester City Council was 
reduced by nearly 30% in real terms between 1986/87 and 1987/88 
(Figure 16j) . This was- .due to a reduction in major works 
expenditure accepted for TSG. However, an increase in the 
expenditure accepted for TSG-eligible minor works resu1ted.h a 
smaller proportion of the allocation being available for non-TSG 
schemes. Moreover, whereas the Council had been able to 
supplement the roads allocation in 1986/87 by virement, use of 
leasing facilities and capital receipts, the roads capital budget 
for 1987/88 was contained within the roads allocation. This was 
basically because the Council decided that priority in the use of 
capital receipts had to go to other services in order to address 
problems and needs considered to be the most pressing. 
As a result of these restraints the expected outturn expenditure 
on the roads capital programme for 1987/88 is only 44% of the 
original TPP bid, the programme having gone through two trimming 
exercises. The main 'casualtiesf in these exercises can be 
outlined briefly: 
a) Substantial structural improvement funded from capital on 
roads which are in poor structural condition as a result of 
traffic volumes significantly above design loads; no 
provision was possible in the 1987/88 budget, the bid for 
TSG having been rejected: 
"... an inadequate allocation for the current year has led 
to the curtailment of ... work leaving a backlog of 
structurally failed carriageways as a result of overloading, 
and a finegcial remirement of f2.221m to tackle the worst 
problems. 
b) Street lighting improvements needed to improve safety and 
security and to reduce maintenance costs; no provision was 
possible in the 1987/88 budget to continue a programme of 
renewals to outdated systems: 
alUnless adequate spending powers are made available for this 
type of work by Central Government the City Council will be 
forced to continue maintaining outdated and inefficient 
installations at an ever increasing cost.1n55 
c) Bridge reconstruction and renovation to tackle structural 
problems which are restricting the routes available for 
heavy goods vehicles; the final budget figure for 1987/88 
was only 37% of the TPP bid. 
d) Traffic regulation, road safety, accident prevention and 
cycling schemes: provision in the 1987/88 budget was only 
half of the TPP bid figure resulting in delays to schemes of 
generally low cost and high benefits 'n terms of improving 
traffic flows and reducing accidents. 5 k 
As regards the latter two items schemes relating to TSG- 
ineligible roads were affected most. Expenditure on highway 
works was not affected to the same extent, most of it relating to 
TSG-eligible schemes. Thus, whereas such expenditure made up 
about 47% of the TPP bid, it comprised some 60% of the final 
capital programme following revision. 
Various points are raised by Manchester City Council in 
considering the implicatians of expenditure restraints for the 
roads capital programme. 57 First, the restricted allocation 
reduces the Councills ability to purchase land in advance for 
highway schemes which in turn undermines its ability to 
demonstrate a commitment to implementing schemes which is 
important in gaining acceptance for TSG in future years. Second, 
the cuts in capital expenditure have potentially damaging 
consequences for the City Councills Direct Labour Organisation 
which might be unable to attract sufficient work to maintain its 
workforce. Third, the restraints on capital expenditure are seen 
as undermining the Councills ability to meet its obligations as a 
highway authority. 
"The low capital allocation in particular will make it 
difficult for the City Council to meet its overall highway 
and transportation responsibilities. The Council will 
inevitably be frustrated in the realisation of its policy 
objectives to improve safety for the disabled, pedestrians 
and cyclists, to ease traffic flows for public transport and 
to carry out industrial and environmental improvements in 
areas of dereliction and deprivation unles capital funding 
for highway works can be made available. 1158 
More generally, it is argued that I#... the benefits of the 
Council's extensive programme of urban and industrial 
regeneration will be devalued as the lack of funds for the 
provision of an up to date road network within such argp will 
make access difficult and thus reduce their attracti~n.~~ 
5.4 Conclusion 
It is possible to conclude, then, that the Government's present 
approach to controlling local authorities1 highways capital 
expenditure is presenting authorities with some difficulties in 
terms of their ability to address effectively their local 
transport problems and needs. The difficulties arise 
fundamentally from the restraints on capital allocations and the 
operation of assumptions relating to authorities1 ability to 
supplement their spending power for highways expenditure from 
capital receipts. It would appear that, on the whole, local 
authorities are displaying a commitment to the TSG system with 
expenditure on TSG-eligible works matching 'accepted' levels this 
being encouraged by the system of TSG lclawbackl in relation to 
major schemes. Indeed, there is evidence of authorities spending 
more than accepted levels on TSG eligible minor works suggesting 
a degree of under-provision by the Government for such works. 
However, the increase in provision for TSG-eligible expenditure 
combined with the decrease in roads capital allocation has 
resulted in a significant reduction in the amount of capital 
allocation available to support expenditure on non-TSG highways 
works which, by definition, are those directed specifically at 
local problems and needs. Therefore, the ability of authorities 
to address such problems and needs has become more dependent upon 
their capacity to supplement their roads allocations either by 
virement from other block allocations or by the application of 
capital receipts. 
This is the case particularly in the Shire Counties which have 
experienced the largest reductions in roads allocations,-and in 
the metropolitan districts and Inner London boroughs whose 
allocations constitute relatively low proportions of their .bids. 
However, the shire counties suffer the most from the Governmentls 
assumptions about the availability of capital receipts because 
these authorities do not have access to the largest sourc 
e of 
receipts viz the sale of council houses. Moreover there is an 
imbalance between shire authorities in terms of their actual 
spending power from receipts and, in particular, something of a 
North-South divide arising f m the substantial differentials in 
land and property values. The metropolitan districts in 
general have substantial receipts, being housing authorities, but 
in these authorities there would appear to be problems deriving 
from the priority assigned to highways expenditure relative to 
the otner traditional, long-established services which face heavy 
demands for increased expenditure due to the range of economic 
and social problems in those areas. 
Therefore, highways capital expenditure directed at the 
specifically local problems and needs faced by local authorities 
is clearly subject to severe restraint within the present 
framework of capital expenditure controls. The problem has three 
main dimensions. First, there is a discrepancy between the level 
of detail in the spending objectives and targets which the 
Government wishes to achieve and the capacity of the control 
mechanisms, and assumptions embodied therein, to achieve them. 
Second, and arising from this discrepancy, the substantive 
assumptions applied by the Government in the operation of the 
control framework fail to match the reality faced by many 
individual authorities; therefore, many authorities are unable to 
deliver the expenditure outputs consistent with the Governmentls 
objectives and adequate to match their local needs. Third, the 
degree of discretion and control available to local authorities 
to determine their own priorities within the framework of capital 
expenditure control means that authorities collectively may 
choose not to deliver expenditure outputs consistent with the 
Government's objectives and, effectively, to subordinate local 
transport problems and needs to other needs perceived as more 
pressing. 
From our analysis of selected local authorities a general picture 
emerges as to the nature of highways capital works which are 
experiencing the most severe restraint in the present 
circumstances and the types of problems and needs which are 
therefore not being addressed as effectively as they otherwise 
might: 
1. Major structural re-conditioning and improvement of roads 
funded from capital: 
Authorities which have applied for TSG in respect of 
such works on roads of more than local importance have 
tended not to be successful. The funding of such works 
on all roads has therefore had to rely on the non-TSG 
proportion of capital allocation or capital receipts 
and has been subject to restraint where such sources 
are limited resulting in a growing problem of 
structurally-failed roads. 
- 
.- . 
2. Schemes for the construction and improvement of local roads: 
Many authorities have some relatively large schemes not 
eligible for TSG which must be accommodated in the non- 
TSG portion of capital allocation, supplemented where 
possible from other sources. There is evidence of 
authorities having to delay the implementation of such 
schemes. 
3. Minor works programmes: 
Such programmes comprise relatively low cost works 
directed primarily at traffic management, environmental 
and safety problems, usually providing highly cost- 
effective solutions but subject to cuts when non-TSG 
resources are constrained. Particularly badly affected 
within such programmes are facilities for cyclists, 
facilities and schemes to improve the effectiveness and 
attractiveness of public transport, bridge 
reconstruction and repair works and the replacement and 
improvement of street lighting. 
4 .  Car parking facilities: 
The removal of this element from the transport capital 
allocation makes it more difficult for authorities to 
secure appropriate parking facilities since the 
presumption is that these should be funded from trading 
profits or capital receipts or provided by the private 
sector. Many authorities are sceptical about the scope 
for providing the necessary facilities from receipts 
and the prospects for private sector provision and see 
threats to commercial development of town centres and 
to tourism and to their ability to formulate integrated 
and co-ordinated transport policies dependent upon 
control over parking. 
Certain other areas of concern on the part of local authorities 
emerge from our analysis which can be summarised briefly. First, 
certain authorities express concern about the burden of advance 
works and land acquisition costs in respect of TSG-eligible 
schemes which do not achieve early conditional acceptance since 
such costs must be borne fully by the non-TSG element of capital 
allocation or by capital receipts, and are necessary in order to 
demonstrate commitment to a scheme and therefore enhance its 
prospects of eventual acceptance for TSG support. Second, many 
authorities are clearly concerned about the impact on their 
Direct Labour Organisations of restraints on smaller schemes and 
minor works programmes which are not providing sufficient work to 
maintain a constant workload in an environment where they must 
compete for tenders. 
A final area of concern relates to the availability of resources 
to finance road schemes which are important in the promotion of 
local economic development. One aspect of this (raised by 
Cornwall CC) concerns the availability of finance to ensure 
progress of road schemes attracting EEC support (from the ERDF) 
so that grants are not *opardised. Another aspect Concerns 
authorities' ability to implement schemes which provide access to 
areas with prospects for industrial and commercial development 
and thus help to maximise the benefits from roads investment for 
local economic development. Many authorities formulate their 
highways programmes in the context of their wider strategies for 
local economic development/regeneration and restraints on 
resources for non-TSG works have produced concern about the 
prospects for programmes of highway access schemes. This has led 
certain authorities to take up the issue of partnership with the 
private sector in financing road schemes where such schemes 
provide clear benefits to developers. 
6. Summarv and Discussion 
6.1 Summarv 
The Government has placed increasing emphasis in recent years on 
the role of roads investment in promoting economic growth and 
increasing the competitiveness of industry through reduced 
transport costs. This can be seen as consistent with the 
Governmentfs broader economic and political programme for Britain 
involving the reduction of the 'burdenf of public expenditure on 
private sector capital accumulation and the re-orientation of 
of such expenditure in such a way as to enhance its role in 
supporting and promoting the profitability of the private sector. 
Changes in the Governmentfs approach to supporting and 
controlling expenditure by local authorities on roads 
construction and improvement have been implemented within this 
context. Specifically, the reform of the TSG system in 1985/86 
concentrated government support with the purpose of encouraging 
local authorities to build or improve roads which provide 
particular benefits to longer distance commercial and industrial 
traffic and which otherwise might not have high priority in terms 
of purely local considerations. 
The resources provided to local authorities through TSG have 
increased in real terms since 1985/86 and have constituted an 
increasing proportion of the spending power provided through 
capital allocations. This is particularly so since 1987/88 when 
allocations were reduced on the assumption that authorities would 
be able to apply spending power accumulated through capital 
receipts to roads capital expenditure. In fact, spending power 
from receipts is unevenly distributed between authorities and for 
the many which are in practice unable to apply receipts to roads 
expenditure the result has been a severe restraint on the 
resources available for those elements of their highways capital 
programmes which are directed at specifically local problems and 
needs. 
Since the bulk of TSG support is in respect of major schemes 
which are subject to detailed monitoring by the DTp (86% of gross 
accepted expenditure in 1988/89 was for major works) there has 
been a tendency for the restraints on capital allocations to 
erode the scope for the exercise of discretion by authorities in 
the direction of resources to meet local needs through integrated 
transport plans and programmes. Fewer resources are available 
for non-TSG programmes of local highway and traffic management I 
schemes, facilities for cyclists, schemes to improve public 
transport operation and promote inter-modal co-ordination, and 
parking facilities which provide the degree of control necessary 
to integrated and co-ordinated transport planning. The scope for 
such an approach to meeting local transport problems and needs 
has also been eroded by the reduction in control by local 
authorities over the provision of local public transport services 
due to the deregulation of local bus services in the 1985 
Transport Act. 
The analysis of resource provision for local road construction 
and improvement is subje&.to the problem of limited thescale 
since the reform of the TSG in 1985/86. In that year there were 
clearly many uncertainties about the new system and the following 
year brought the disruptions due to the abolition of the GLC and 
metropolitan counties which resulted in a net transfer of 
resources to the successor authorities (particularly the 
metropolitan districts) at the expense of the shire authorities. 
Since 1986/87 there has been a relative shift in resources back 
to the south of the contry, primarily to the Outer London area 
where several major road schemes have made heavy demands on TSG 
resources. This has been at the expense of other authorities 
whose share of TSG has declined. The Inner London Boroughs have 
suffered reductions in both TSG and capital allocations. The 
shire counties have experienced significant reductions in capital 
allocations. The metropolitan districts have suffered less of a 
reduction in allocation in absolute terms but have seen it 
decline as a proportion of their TPP bids. This is particularly 
so in the larger city authorities. 
However, it is the shire counties which have suffered most from 
the reduction in capital allocations because these authorities, 
on the whole, do not have access to capital receipts on the scale 
assumed by the Government in setting allocations. This is 
firstly because transport does not generate capital receipts on a 
substantial scale and, secondly, because the shire counties do 
not have responsibilities for housing, the major source of 
receipts. Moreover, actual spending power from receipts is 
unevenly distributed between authorities. In particular, there 
is something of an imbalance between the north and south of the 
contry arising from the substantial differentials in land and 
property values. 
The metropolitan districts, as housing authorities, do, in 
general, have substantial capital receipts. However, these 
authorities would appear to be experiencing some difficulties in 
assigning receipts to support roads capital programmes arising 
from three sources. First, a reluctance on the part of Housing 
Committees to give up spending power from receipts because of the 
severe housing problems experienced by many metropolitan 
authorities. Second, the priority assigned to roads expenditure 
relative to the other traditional, long-established services 
(such as education, social services, housing, leisure and 
community services and economic development) which face heavy 
demands for increased expenditure due to the range of economic 
and social problems in these areas. Third, the magnification of 
these effects by the reductions in capital allocations for those 
other services. 
The net result of these effects has been a severe restraint on 
non-TSG roads capital expenditure because spending on TSG- 
supported works has increased consistent with the Government's 
provision. This has adversely affected the ability of 
authorities to address transport problems and needs which are, by 
definition, of specifically local importance. Authorities are 
having to delay highly cost-effective schemes directed at local 
traffic, environmental and safety problems and designed to assist 
local economic development. Schemes to improve provision for 
cyclists and to improve the effectiveness and attractiveness of 
public transport appear to be suffering particularly badly. 
Delays to badly-needed structural repairs and improvements to 
roads and bridges and to programmes for replacement and 
improvement of street lighting create increased demands on 
revenue spending and higher future demands on capital 
expenditure. Lack of funds for off-street parking facilities 
creates potential difficulties for the development of commercial 
centres and tourism and for authorities wishing to employ parking 
development in strategies to achieve effective management of 
traffic. 
6.2 Discussion 
The problems which we have highlighted can be analysed in terms 
of the interaction between, on the one hand, the framework 
established by central government for supporting and controlling 
local government capital expenditure and, on the other hand, the 
approach pursued by local authorities, within the parameters of 
this framework, in the determination of priorities for 
expenditure to address the perceived problems and needs of their 
areas. 
The Government's expenditure control framework can be seen to 
embody two sources of tension. The first arises between the 
interests of central government service departments in promoting 
and supporting expenditure of particular types to achieve their 
objectives and the interests of the Treasury in controlling local 
government expenditure in order to achieve broader macro-economic 
objectives. The second source of tension lies between the 
interests of central government in influencing and controlling 
local government expenditure to conform with its objectives and 
the interests of local government in maintaining a substantial 
degree of autonomy to determine expenditure priorities in 
accordance with local considerations. 
The problem with local roads capital expenditure, in terms of 
both its failure to conform to the Government's plans and its 
failure to address effectively local needs, can be seen as 
arising in large part, from these tensions. For example, the 
Government's approach over the years to local authorities1 use of 
capital receipts has been conditioned primarily by the concern to 
control capital spending but the aggregate-level approaches 
adopted, whilst serving control objectives in respect of some 
services, have helped to promote underspending on local roads 
thus contradicting transport objectives. Nevertheless, within 
the broader framework the Department of Transport is achieving 
some success in promoting expenditure on certain types of road 
through the TSG system in contradiction of the broader 
underspending. This can be seen as indicative of a tension 
between, on the one hand, the interests of the Department of 
Transport in promoting certain types of expenditure and the 
interests of the Treasury (embodied via the Department of the 
Environment in the local government expenditure control systems) 
in limiting local authorities1 spending power. 
The problem of inadequate resources for non-TSG local roads 
expenditure is certainly an ,unintentional consequence1 of the 
system. The tensions manifested in the apparent lack of inter- 
departmental co-ordination within central government are 
exacerbated by those relating to the conflict between central 
controls and local autonumy. Thus, formally, the syst&ms for 
controlling local government expenditure embody the principle of 
local authoritiesf freedom to determine their own priorities 
within parameters set by central government. There are also 
statutory limits on the power of the Government to exercise 
detailed control over individual local authorities. 
From the local authoritiesf point of view the problem has two 
dimensions. First, the provisions and assumptions made by 
central government, reflecting the balance of interests within 
the central state and the limits to the detail of central 
government intervention, fail to match the reality faced by many 
individual authorities. Therefore, many authorities are unable 
to deliver the expenditure outputs consistent with the 
Government's objectives on the one hand, and adequate to match 
their local needs on the other. In this sense, the Government is 
demanding too much from its control mechanisms given the limits 
to control deriving from tensions within central government and 
from formal limits to central government intervention. 
The second dimension of the problem from the local authoritiesf 
viewpoint relates specifically to the degree of autonomy which 
they enjoy within our political system and which gives them the 
freedom and discretion to determine their own priorities within 
the Government's framework of expenditure controls. Therefore, 
many authorities will choose not to deliver expenditure outputs 
consistent with the Government's objectives faced with the 
parameters of central government control. In effect, when 
priorities have to be established the sum of locally-determined 
priorities may not sum to the centrally-determined view. In this 
sense, the Government is expecting too much from local government 
if the long-established principles of local autonomy and 
discretion are taken seriously. 
This raises some fundamental questions about the relationship 
between central and local government which take us beyond the 
scope of this paper. However, there are certain problem areas in 
this relationship which are relevant to our immediate analysis 
and we can refer to these in the context of certain issues which 
arise from the analysis. 
6.3 Issues 
Our discussion will refer to various issues relating to two basic 
concerns: first, the effectiveness of the Government's system 
for supporting and controlling local roads capital expenditure; 
and, second, certain considerations relating to equity or 
distributional implications. 
On effectiveness, we can consider first the local authoritiesf 
viewpoint. On the whole, local authorities are displaying a 
commitment to the TSG system with bids exceeding the available 
resources to a significant degree and expenditure on TSG-eligible 
schemes exceeding the level accepted by the DTp for grant 
support. It would appear, therefore, that local authorities are 
obtaining significant benefits for local road users and 
communities from TSG-supported schemes which make locally-borne 
costs worthwhile from their perspective. However, there are 
specific complaints relating, for example, to the timescale of 
eligibility of costs f m  grant support and to the- grant 
fclawbackf system, and there is evidence that, from the local 
authorities1 point of view, inadequate support is given to .minor 
works. In particular, the lack of grant support for capital 
expenditure on structural re-conditioning and improvement can be 
seen as an issue requiring consideration. 
Many local authorities clearly are having severe problems with 
the operation of the broader capital expenditure control system 
and, in particular, with the treatment of capital receipts. The 
uneven distribution of capital receipts produces inequities, and 
we shall return to this below. It also has implications for 
effectiveness because authorities facing severe restraints are 
unable to implement relatively high priority schemes whereas 
those with above average receipts will be able to include schemes 
lower down their priority lists. The Government's system for 
capital expenditure control should attempt to ensure that, in 
broad terms, all authorities have a level of spending power which 
enables them to meet a similar proportion of their needs over a 
reasonable time period. The present approach to capital receipts 
does not achieve this and needs to be re-examined. 
We have seen that it is programmes of non-TSG works which have 
suffered most in those authorities unable to. supplement their 
roads capital allocations substantially from receipts. Such 
capital works are directed at specifically local problems and 
needs and are traditionally of particular concern to local 
councillors. We have no evidence to suggest that the restraints 
on such works due to the operation of the combined TSG and 
broader capital expenditure control system are creating 
sufficient frustration to provide the basis for a 'backlash1 
against TSG schemes. However, this could always be a danger so 
long as some authorities feel unfairly treated by the system. 
The restraint on non-TSG expenditure raises two specific concerns 
in terms of effectiveness. First, there is evidence that cuts in 
expenditure are bearing heavily on less 'visible1 elements in 
authorities1 highways programmes such as repairs to structures 
and replacement of street lighting. The result is a higher 
burden on revenue spending and higher future capital costs. 
Second, as we have argued previously, there are adverse 
implications for authorities1 ability to adopt an integrated and 
co-ordinated approach to the development of local transport 
services and facilities, which are exacerbated by the effects of 
bus deregulation. 
As regards the Government's viewpoint on effectiveness in 
relation to TSG support, the fact that authorities1 bids for TSG 
exceed the available resources to a significant degree provides 
the element of competition for grant which is seen as important 
in ensuring that the available resources are used effectively. 
However, this test of effectiveness is confined within the 
consideration of alternative road schemes which are eligible for 
TSG - it assumes a given level of resources for such schemes in 
total. It is also important to consider effectiveness in a 
wider sense, in relation to possible alternative uses for those 
resources - alternative types of road schemes, alternative 
transport investment, use for other non-transport purposes etc. 
In other words, it is important to consider opportunity costs. 
In such a consideration the crucial question is: How effective 
is TSG support in achieving the objectives and securing the 
benefits as designated for the TSG system? We can make a few 
observations in relation to this question. 
Many of the schemes put forward to date by local authorities for 
TSG support would have been in their roads forward programmes 
prior to the reform of the TSG system. It can be presumed, 
therefore, that, given adequate resources, such schemes would 
have been implemented even in the absence of the reform of the 
TSG system. These schemes would have been seen as producing 
significant benefits for local road users and communities and 
many would have been commenced but for the restraints on local 
authorities capital expenditure (exacerbated by revenue 
expenditure restraints and their impact on debt charges). 
A good example is the Avon Ring Road. In the 1982/83 TPP 
submission (para 3.10) Avon County Council argued that: 
"It is considered that the proposed Avon Ring Road will make 
a significant contribution to resolving many of Bristo18s 
traffic problems and the provision of such a road is also an 
integral part of proposals for increasing employment, by 
improving access to the area." 
The County Council was committed to implementing this scheme on 
the basis of a purely local assessment of its benefits but the 
scheme was delayed due to cuts in TSG and capital allocations, 
aggravated by restrictions on revenue spending, particularly in 
1983/84. It is clear that this scheme would have been built had 
the resources been made available under the pre-1985/86 TSG 
system. However, the stated objective of the reformed TSG system 
is to promote the construction of roads of more than local 
importance that local authorities would not otherwise give high 
priority. In the case of the Avon Ring Road, therefore (and 
doubtless many other schemes in other authorities) the question 
of the effectiveness of the new TSG system is not clear-cut due 
to this uncertainty about the existence of unique Inon-local' 
benefits. 
There must be doubts, then, about the extent to which reform of 
the TSG system was necessary to secure the implementation of many 
of the schemes which have attracted TSG support since 1985/86. 
The real test of the effectiveness of the new TSG system will be 
the extent to which it genuinely does encourage local authorities 
to design and build new schemes of more than local importance 
which they would not otherwise have considered, rather than help 
authorities to implement major schemes which had already been in 
their programmes as solutions to local problems. As the backlog 
of these latter schemes is cleared and attention turns more to 
the former, we might anticipate that local authorities' 
commitment to the TSG system will become more dependent upon the 
extent to which the broader capital expenditure control system 
permits them to direct adequate resources to meet those problems 
and needs which are essentially local in character and which are 
the primary 'raison d'tret of local government. As indicated 
earlier there are grounds for reservations on this score based on 
the present operation of the system. 
In considering the issue--of effectiveness we must refer also to 
the emphasis in the Government's objectives and policies for 
roads upon the role of roads investment in assisting economic 
growth and, in particular, in reducing burdens on industry 
through lower transport costs. Effectiveness in the use of TSG 
resources therefore depends to a significant degree upon the 
extent to which TSG-supported schemes produce benefits in terms 
of these objectives. This is a complex issue which is really 
beyond the scope of our analysis but it has to be said that 
research studies conducted to date have not produced much 
evidence to support an argument for effectiveness in this 
respect. However such research does not provide an adeuqate 
basis for firm conclusions and there is certainly a case for more 
work in this area. 
A specific issue which arises in this context concerns the 
relative benefits to industry, and to the promotion of economic 
growth, of investment in major roads forming the Primary Route 
Network on the one hand, as against investment in local roads 
providing access to the sites which actually generate and attract 
commercial and industrial traffic on the other. Research 
conducted in inner urban areas of London and Leeds by Patterson 
and May (1981) highlighted the importance to firms of local 
traffic problems. The implication of their conclusions is that 
any benefits to industry from improvements to the major road 
network might be jeopardised if problems exist with local access 
to sites of industrial and commercial activity. This is likely 
to be particularly relevant for industry in inner city areas. 
While many TSG-supported schemes are designed to improve access 
from the motorway and trunk road network to major sites of 
industrial and economic activity, there is nevertheless an 
important role to be played by non-TSG highway schemes in 
improving local access for commercial and industrial traffic, 
especially in large urban areas. However, the restraints on 
resources for non-TSG programmes particularly in those 
authorities with below-average access to capital receipts, 
potentially undermine this role. 
Attention needs to be given, therefore, to two questions. First, 
what are the relative potential benefits to industry and to the 
promotion of economic growth from major schemes eligible for TSG 
support on the one hand, and from local schemes which do not 
attract TSG support on the other? Second, given the Government's 
objectives for road investment does the present system for 
supporting and controlling roads capital expenditure promote the 
right balance of resource allocation between these types of 
schemes? There would appear to be grounds for arguing that the 
present circumstances faced by local authorities do not result in 
adequate resources to tackle the local dimension of this problem. 
Uncertainty about the effectiveness of TSG support in achieving 
objectives relating to economic growth produces other grounds for 
questions about the balance of resource allocation to local roads 
investment. We have seen that the restraints on resources for 
non-TSG highway programmes are causing cuts and delays in many 
authorities to schemes with substantial benefits to local 
communities, in terms of traffic, environmental and safety 
objectives. The question arises, therefore, as to whether or not 
a transfer of resources from TSG to provide additional support 
for such local schemes wou-ld result in a net increase in benefits 
and therefore in an overall increase in effectiveness in the use 
of resources for roads investment. of course, an important.issue 
here concerns the relative valuation and weighting of different 
types of benefits and this takes us into the consideration of 
distributional implications, 
It is clear that the distribution of benefits from schemes which 
fulfill the criteria for TSG support will be significantly 
different from that deriving from local non-TSG schemes. The 50% 
grant support from the Government is designed specifically to 
fcompensatef local authorities for the benefits accruing to Inon- 
local* users and communities. Nevertheless, the nature of the 
benefits from TSG schemes which must be set against the local 
authoritiesf half of the funding is likely to be, on the whole, 
somewhat different from the make-up of benefits from purely local 
non-TSG schemes. We do not have much evidence on this matter but 
it is reasonable to posit that many of the benefits related to 
local authoritiesf funding of TSG schemes will tend to accrue to 
local business and commercial traffic, private car commuters and 
to communities relieved from the intrusion of traffic, 
particularly heavy goods traffic. On the other hand, we have 
seen that restraints on resources for non-TSG programmes have 
tended to adversely affect schemes producing benefits for public 
transport users, cyclists and pedestrians. The question of a 
transfer of resources between TSG and non-TSG components of road 
programmes should also address these distributional issues in the 
context of the consideration of effectiveness. 
A further important distributional issue raised by our analysis 
relates to regional trends in resource allocation for roads 
investment. Recent trends indicating a shift in resources 
towards the southern 'heartlandf may be a temporary phenomenon 
due to the peak in resources required by the large Outer London 
schemes. Alternatively, they may reflect an inherent tendency 
for resources to be attracted towards areas experiencing growth 
in economic activity and traffic levels since the case for 
investment is demonstrated more soundly within the framework for 
assessing TSG support. If this is the case, the northern and 
*peripheralf regions face a more difficult task in making the 
case for resources. An additional aspect of the problem lies in 
the unequal distribution of spending power from capital receipts 
with authorities in the south benefitting from high land and 
property values. 
The implications of these trends for inequalities in economic 
well-being are difficult to assess. Much depends on the 
question discussed earlier of the extent to which investment in 
roads is an important factor in assisting economic growth. A 
better understanding of this relationship is clearly important to 
the consideration of the extent to which roads investment could 
and should be an element in any regional policy designed to 
combat any danger of a 'vicious circlef of decline in northern 
and peripheral regions while controlling a *virtuous circle* of 
growth in the southern ,heartlandf. More clear cut is the 
evidence of the regional dimension to the problem of access to 
spending power from capital receipts which needs to be taken into 
account in the reform of this aspect of the capital expenditure 
control system - a reform which is clearly needed. The 
Government8s proposals for-reform, announced for consultation in 
July 1988, do, in fact, address this problem through a system of 
'credit approvals1 which would take into account spending .power 
from receipts. 
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Notes on Fiaures 
Fiaure 1 
1. 'Expenditure1 = outturn for 1985/86 and 1986/87 and budget 
for 1987/88 
'Provision1 = gross provision for roads and car parks up 
to 1986/87, but roads only from 1987/88 
'Allocation1 = roads capital allocation, excluding car 
parks from 1987/88 
'TSG-Acceptedg = expenditure accepted for TSG support 
including both major and minor works 
2. Data reduced to 1985/86 prices using GDP deflator published 
by the Government in HM Treasury (1988, Volume 1, p. 91). 
3. Source is HM Treasury (1985-1988) and data supplied by DTp. 
Fiaure 2 
1. This figure compares roads capital budgets for 1987/88 (87/8 
BD) with capital allocations (87/8 AL) . 
2. 'TSG Major1 = Expenditure on ' major works (> elm) 
eligible for TSG support 
'TSG Minor1 = Expenditure on minor works eligible for 
TSG support 
'Non TSG A1loc1= Expenditure on schemes not eligible for 
TSG support within the roads capital 
allocation 
Other' = Expenditure on non TSG works in excess of 
roads capital allocation 
3. Data are in outturn prices. 
4. Source is 1988/89 TPP submissions for authorities concerned 
and data supplied by DTp. 
1. This figure shows trends in roads capital allocations and 
expenditure accepted for TSG support (gross expenditure 
before adjustment for TSG 'clawback'). 
2. See Figure 2 for notes on categories. 
3. Data reduced to 1985/86 using GDP deflator (cf. Figure 1). 
4 .  Source is data supplied by DTp. 
1. Data for 1985/86 relate to the GLC and Metropolitan 
Counties; for 1986/-87 onwards to the London Boroughs and 
Metropolitan Districts. 
2. 'Inner LBCsl = Inner London Boroughs (excl. City) 
'Outer LBCsl = Outer London Boroughs 
'Met DCs8 = Metropolitan District Councils 
'Shire CCsl = Shire County Councils 
3. Source is data supplied by DTp. 
Fiaure 5 
1. This figure shows trends in roads capital allocation per 
capita and the proportion relating to expenditure accepted 
for TSG support by standard region in England 1985/86 to 
1988/89. 
2. Regions are: North (N) , Yorkshire and Humberside (YH) , 
North West (NW), West Midlands (WM), East Midlands (EM), 
East Anglia (EA), Greater London (GL), remainder of South 
East excluding Greater London (SE), and South West (SW). 
3. Source is data supplied by DTp. 
Fiaure 6 
1. This figure compares expenditure accepted for TSG support 
and roads capital allocations with bids submitted by 
authorities in TPPs for England as a whole, 1985/86 to 
1988/89. 
2. ITSG Acceptedf = Total expenditure accepted for TSG support 
net of adjustments for underspending on 
major schemes 
'TSG Bid1 = Expenditure submitted in TPPs for TSG 
support 
Net of adjustment for underspend on major 
schemes 
'Allocationf = Roads capital allocation 
'Total Bid' = Expenditure submitted in TPPs for capital 
allocation (including TSG-eligible) 
3. Data reduced to 1985/86 prices using GDP deflator. 
4. Source is data supplied by DTp. 
Fiaure 7 
1. This figure shows TSG-accepted expenditure and roads capital 
allocations as a proportion of the respective TPP 'bid 
expenditures' by local authority class 1985/86 to 1988/89. 
2. See notes on Figure 4. 
3 .  Source is data supplied by DTp. 
Fiaure 8 
1. This figure shows TSG-accepted expenditure and roads capital 
allocations as a proportion of the respective TPP 'bid 
expenditures1 in the six main city authorities in the 
metropolitan areas compared with the Metropolitan Districts 
as a whole, 1986/87 to 1988/89. 
2. The six city authorities are: Manchester, Liverpool, 
Sheffield, Newcastle, Birmingham, Leeds. 
3. Source is data supplied by DTp. 
Fiaure 9 
1. This figure shows TSG-accepted expenditure and roads capital 
allocations as a proportion of the respective TPP 'bid 
expenditures1 by standard region in England 1985/86 to 
1988/89. 
2. For definition of regions see notes on Figure 5. 
3. 'Alloc' = Roads capital allocation as a percentage 
of total TPP 'bid expenditure* 
'TSG' = Expenditure accepted for TSG support as a 
proportion of the TPP bid for such 
support. 
4 .  Source is data supplied by DTp. 
Fiaure 10 
1. These figures present information on local authorities1 
capital expenditure in terms of means of financing, 
composition of payments and source of capital receipts in 
1986/87. 
2. Data in each local authority class relate to those 
authorities submitting returns to CIPFA as follows: 
' LBCs ' = London Boroughs (23 out of 33 incl. City) 
'MDCs8 = Metropolitan District Councils (30 out of 
36) 
'SDCsl = Shire Counties (38 out of 39) 
3. Source is Chartered Institute of Public Finance and 
Accountancy, CIPFA (1988) . 
Fiaure 11 
1. This figure compares local authority classes in terms of per 
capita spending power available from capital receipts in 
1986/87. 
2. 'Appliedf = Tobl capital receipts utilised during the 
year in capital financing 
Prescribed' = Spending power deriving from prescribed 
proportions. 
3. See Note 2 on Figure 10. 
4. Source: See Note 3 on Figure 10. 
Fiaure 12 
1. This figure illustrates the regional breakdown of the Shire 
Counties in terms of per capita receipts applied to capital 
financing in 1986/87. 
2. For definitions of regions see Note 2 on Figure 5. 
3. For other definitions amd source see notes on Figure 11. 
Fiaure 13 
1. This figure compares per capita payments and allocations in 
respect of selected services by local authority class in 
1986/87. 
2. 'PSS' = Personal Social Services 
'EDUCf = Education 
I TRAIT' = Highways and Local Transport (incl. 
public transport in the shire counties) 
3. Data on payments in each local authority class relate to 
those authorities submitting returns to CIPFA as follows: 
a) London Boroughs: All boroughs (23 out of 33 incl. 
City) for personal social services and highways; Outer 
London Boroughs only (16 out of 20) for education 
b) Metropolitan Districts (30 out of 36) 
c) Shire Counties (38 out of 39) 
I 
4. Data on capital allocations relate to all authorities in 
each class (Outer London Boroughs only for education). 1 I 
5. Source: see Note 3 on Figure 10. 
Ficrure 14 I 
1. This figure compares per capita roads capital allocation and 
TSG-accepted expenditure on major and minor works for the 
sample of thirteen local authorities and all shire and 
metropolitan authorities, 1985/86 to 1988/89 (1985/86 Shire 
CCs only) . 
2. For definitions see notes to Figure 2. I 
3. The identification of the sample authorities is provided in 
Note 36 to the text. 
- 
.-. . 
4.  Data are reduced to 1985/86 prices using GDP deflator. 
5. Source is data supplied by DT. 
Fiaure 15 
1. This figure compares roads expenditure with capital 
allocation and TSG-accepted expenditure in 1986/87 and 
1987/88 for the sample of shire counties and the total 
sample of authorities. 
2. Expenditure data is outturn in 1986/87 (87/7 EX) and budget 
in 1987/88 (87/8 BD) . 
3. For other definitions see Notes 1 and 2 to Figure 2. 
4.  Data reduced to 1985/86 prices using GDP deflator. 
5. Source is data supplied by individual authorities and by 
DTp . 
Fiqure 16 
1. These figures disaggregate the information summarised in 
Figure 15 to individual authorities. 
2. See notes to Figure 15. 
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